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UNITED STATES V. WECHT: WHEN ANONYMOUS JURIES, 
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS, AND JUDICIAL  
DISCRETION COLLIDE 
Seth A. Fersko∗ 
I.INTRODUCTION 
The United States was a young country in 1807 when proceed-
ings began in Aaron Burr’s treason trial.1  The former vice president 
sat accused of treason for allegedly conspiring to wage war against the 
United States.
2
  By all accounts, the trial was such a spectacle that the 
country had not seen anything like it before, even during the colonial 
period.  Although newspapers at the time virtually ignored the courts, 
the Burr trial “captivated the American public’s attention,” and the 
newspapers happily obliged the public’s interest.
3
  The news reports 
were so invasive and the editorials were so provocative that Burr al-
leged that the coverage prejudiced the jury against him.
4
  Acknowl-
edging that some jurors might have formed opinions, Chief Justice 
John Marshall, serving as the trial judge,
5
 instructed the jury to re-
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2004, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin–Madison.  I wish to thank Professor Edward Hartnett, Patricia Hag-
dorn, and Andrew Darcy for their assistance.  I also want to thank my father, Jack 
Fersko, for his invaluable suggestions and my wife, Diana Fersko, for her love and 
support. 
 1 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 2 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). 
 2 See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE AARON BURR TREASON TRIAL 2 (2006), 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/burr.nsf/page/burr_pdf/$file/BurrTrial(final).pdf. 
 3 Id. at 34. 
 4 See COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYS., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE “FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL” ISSUE, 45 F.R.D. 
391, 394 n.2 (1968) [hereinafter FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL REPORT]. 
 5 Burr’s trial took place in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Virginia be-
cause it had original jurisdiction.  See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 2.  In the early nineteenth 
century, the circuit courts lacked their own judges, which meant that one Justice 
from the Supreme Court of the United States and one district court judge from the 
circuit sat on the circuit court.  See HOBSON, supra note 2, at 9.  Thus, Chief Justice 
Marshall, as the Supreme Court Justice assigned to the Circuit Court for the District 
of Virginia, presided over Burr’s trial as the trial judge.  See id. 
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main open to the evidence and witness testimony.
6
  Despite the pre-
judicial media coverage, the jury acquitted Burr of treason.
7
 
Since 1807, courts have occasionally witnessed high public inter-
est in criminal trials.
8
  In the early 1920s, the newspapers and public 
carefully followed the Sacco and Vanzetti arrests and murder trial.
9
  
The media coverage continued throughout the defendants’ appeals 
and right up to their execution.
10
  Reporters even tracked down the 
original jurors from the trial—seven years after the guilty verdicts—to 
ask whether, in hindsight, they thought that the trial was fair.
11
  The 
intensity and pervasiveness of the media’s trial coverage, however, 
took on a new character in the 1950s
12
 with the advent of television 
and the growth of broadcast news.
13
 
The justice system witnessed one of the first modern media fren-
zies in the 1954 murder trial of Dr. Samuel Sheppard.
14
  The prosecu-
tion accused Dr. Sheppard, a “handsome, 30-year-old” doctor from an 
 
 6 See 1 DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 415 
(Philadelphia, Hopkins & Earle 1808). 
 7 See HOBSON, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
 8 See ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 21 (1968) (noting that the intertwining of the 
justice system and media coverage “has not suddenly descended upon us as a result 
of the rapid growth of communications in the twentieth century”). 
 9 See, e.g., Louis Stark, Are Sacco and Vanzetti Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1922, at 3.  
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts convicted Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Van-
zetti for murdering a paymaster and a security guard during the course of a payroll 
robbery.  See id.  The trial was highly politicized because Sacco and Vanzetti were 
members of an Italian-American anarchist group connected to the Red Scare.  See id. 
at 3, 14. 
 10 See generally Commonwealth v. Sacco, 158 N.E. 167 (Mass. 1927) (recounting 
and denying the defendants’ challenges to their trial’s fairness); Sacco Jurors Still 
Think Trial Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1927, at 28. 
 11 See Sacco Jurors Still Think Trial Fair, supra note 10. 
 12 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (recognizing the “pervasive-
ness of modern communications”); see also ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE 
PRESS, supra note 8, at 21–22 (noting that the “wider distribution of information” 
makes the interaction between the criminal-justice system and the media more prob-
lematic). 
 13 See generally SIG MICKELSON, THE DECADE THAT SHAPED TELEVISION NEWS: CBS IN 
THE 1950S (1998); see also Kimba M. Wood, Re-Examining the Access Doctrine, COMM. 
LAW., Winter 1994, at 3, 4 (noting that “there was far less concern about the effect of 
pretrial publicity 200 years ago and little or no cause for concern about the juror’s 
privacy interests”). 
 14 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358. 
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Ohio suburb, of brutally murdering his pregnant, thirty-one-year-old 
wife.
15
  The press’s daily trial coverage included 
[a]bout fifty reporters from newspapers, news services, ra-
dio and television networks, with perhaps twenty still and 
movie camera men . . . swarmed over the court house.   
 Except [for] eight or ten seats in the last row, all places in 
the court room not occupied by participants and attendants 
[were] filled by the press.
16
 
Not only were critics concerned about the fairness of the process to 
Dr. Sheppard, the trial also raised serious questions about the privacy 
of jurors because of the pervasive media coverage.
17
 
During the years following the Sheppard trial and Dr. Shep-
pard’s appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States in Sheppard 
v. Maxwell,
18
 the legal community recognized the need to address how 
the media covers high-profile trials and the negative influence exces-
sive media coverage can have on the trial itself.
19
  Congress also em-
 
 15 Ira Henry Freeman, Sheppard’s Trial Interests Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1954, at 
83. 
 16 Id.  In contrast, the 1966 retrial of Dr. Sheppard saw the trial judge implement 
more stringent courtroom controls on the media, the lack of which was the Supreme 
Court’s main criticism of the trial judge in the first trial.  See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 
358–63; Press Rules Set in Sheppard Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1966, at 1 (The judge 
“barred cameras, sound recording devices and stenographic machines from the 
courthouse during the trial or related proceedings and at any recess or adjournment.  
He also banned the installation of teletype machines or special telephones.  He said 
there would be 14 seats reserved for the press.”). 
 17 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 353 (observing that the media and public subjected 
the jurors to intense scrutiny, which included the jurors seeing their pictures in the 
news and receiving letters from unknown persons concerning the trial). 
 18 Id. at 353. 
 19 See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, supra note 8; FREE 
PRESS-FAIR TRIAL REPORT, supra NOTE 4; THE SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND 
THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967); TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, 
PUBLICITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT (1976).  Aside from Shep-
pard, a number of other cases spurred the legal community to address how the media 
covers trials.  See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550–52 (1965) (describing how the 
publicity of the defendant’s pretrial hearing violated his Sixth Amendment rights); 
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (asserting that the “spectacle” of the 
defendant confessing to the police on a local television station was the defendant’s 
trial for any member of the juror pool who watched it); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 
725–29 (1961) (describing how the publicity surrounding the trial made it impossi-
ble to find an impartial jury); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 311–13 (1959) 
(describing how news articles, which discussed the defendant’s prior convictions, 
read by the jurors during trial had to have prejudiced the jury because this informa-
tion was previously excluded by the trial judge as too prejudicial to the defendant). 
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braced the idea of greater judicial discretion and control over crimi-
nal proceedings.
20
  As a result, district courts have relied on case law, 
statutes, and their inherent judicial authority to address intense me-
dia coverage, including withholding jurors’ identities from the public 
by using anonymous juries.
21
  In contrast, because of the media’s First 
 
 20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (2006).  The primary impetus behind the Jury Se-
lection and Service Act of 1968 was the Civil Rights Movement.  JEFFREY ABRAMSON, 
WE, THE JURY:  THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 100 (1994) (stating that 
by moving to a cross-sectional jury system, Congress aimed “to strip away [racial] dis-
crimination,” and as a result, the jury could “achieve . . . [an] impartiality that comes 
from balancing the biases of its members against each other”).  Nonetheless, Con-
gress did not adopt all of the 1968 provisions with the Civil Rights Movement in 
mind.  For example, the legislative history indicates that Congress adopted 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1863(b)(7) to permit the current practices in the various federal district courts to 
persist.  See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 11 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1792, 1801.  Given that 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) dealt with when to publicize juror 
names, Congress’s determination had to go beyond considerations based solely on 
racial discrimination and include the media’s role in the courtroom, which Congress 
decided the local district courts were in the best position to handle.  See id.  In this 
sense, it appears that Congress concurred with the Supreme Court when it recog-
nized the need for greater control of the courtroom by trial judges in light of exces-
sive media coverage.  See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362–63 (1966) 
(“[U]nfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become increasingly 
prevalent.  Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury 
free from outside influences.  Given the pervasiveness of modern communications 
and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the 
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed 
against the accused. . . .  [T]he cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent 
the prejudice at its inception.”). 
 21 See United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 914 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 91–
93 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Mohammed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282–83 (D.D.C. 
2008); United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625–26 (N.D. Ill. 2007).  In the 
past, courts have also imposed gag orders on the press or participants in the case.  See 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966) (suggesting that the trial judge could 
have imposed a gag order on trial participants as it related to the release of prejudi-
cial information); see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) 
(upholding the sanctioning of an attorney for the attorney’s prejudicial statements 
about a pending case).  Compare Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 
(1976) (holding that gag orders on the press are presumptively unconstitutional), 
with United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1551–52 (11th Cir. 1990) (permitting a 
narrowly tailored gag order to prevent the press from airing the private discussions of 
the defendant and the defendant’s lawyers).  In narrow circumstances, courts may 
close trial proceedings.  See infra Part II.C.  Even if the courts may not close trial pro-
ceedings, they may still limit the media’s presence in the courtroom.  See generally 
Sheppard, 384 U.S. 333.  Last, the court may sequester the trial jurors.  See, e.g., id. at 
352–53, 363 (noting that one of the problems in Dr. Sheppard’s trial was that the 
judge failed to even raise “sequestration of the jury . . . sua sponte with counsel” de-
spite the media subjecting the jurors “to [the same] newspaper, radio and television 
coverage . . . [as] the trial [itself, even] while not taking part in the proceedings”). 
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Amendment right of access and the inherent benefits of public trials 
and media scrutiny, the Supreme Court has voiced concern over ex-
cessive judicial measures that close proceedings from the public eye.
22
  
For these reasons, in 1986, the Supreme Court adopted the “expe-
rience and logic” test.
23
  The “experience and logic” test seeks a bal-
ance between too much and too little public access under the First 
Amendment by instructing courts when proceedings must be open or 
may be closed.
24
 
Courts determine whether the “experience and logic” test 
weighs in favor of a First Amendment right of access by examining 
both the historical openness of the proceeding and the benefits and 
detriments of public access.
25
  If a First Amendment right attaches, 
then a presumption of openness applies.
26
  A court can close a pro-
ceeding and overcome this presumption only when detailed, case-
specific findings reveal the necessity of closure.
27
  On the other hand, 
when the First Amendment does not attach, the courts need not 
overcome a constitutional burden to close the proceedings.
28
  Thus, 
courts have far greater discretion and control over the trial process 
 
 22 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 7 
(1986); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577–80 (1980). 
 23 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9. 
 24 Compare United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that 
the First Amendment right of access attaches to plea hearings), with United States v. 
Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1405 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the First Amendment right 
of access does not attach to all pretrial hearings). 
 25 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9. 
 26 See id. at 9. 
 27 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 
(1984). 
 28 Compare id. (holding that a district court judge, to close a proceeding under 
the First Amendment, must base closure on specific findings that show (1) the exis-
tence of an “overriding interest”—any interest that “is essential to preserve higher 
values” than the value of openness—and (2) that closure is “narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest”), with Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978) 
(stating that appellate courts should review a district court judge’s denial of access to 
judicial records under the common-law right of access only for abuse of discretion), 
and Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Un-
der common law, there is a presumption of access accorded to judicial records.  This 
presumption of access, however, can be rebutted if countervailing interests heavily 
outweigh the public interests in access.  The trial court may weigh ‘the interests ad-
vanced by the parties in light of the public interests and the duty of the courts.’  The 
party seeking to overcome the presumption bears the burden of showing some signif-
icant interest that outweighs the presumption.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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when a First Amendment right does not attach because they do not 
need to overcome a constitutional presumption of openness.
29
 
The “experience and logic” test and the stability it achieves have 
worked well, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit up-
set the status quo in United States v. Wecht (Wecht II).
30
  In Wecht II, the 
Third Circuit held that the media has a First Amendment right of 
access to the names and addresses of prospective jurors.
31
  Yet legal 
tradition and policy considerations weigh against the Third Circuit’s 
holding under the “experience and logic” test. 
If Wecht II endures, district judges will lose a significant amount 
of discretion over the jury-selection process and will no longer con-
trol when or how the court releases prospective jurors’ identities to 
the public in high-profile trials.  Instead of using their inherent and 
statutory discretion, courts would first need to rebut a strong, consti-
tutional presumption—rather than a common-law presumption—
that the jurors’ identities are publicly available.  By making it more 
difficult for the district courts to exercise their discretion during jury 
selection, Wecht II ignores the history that led to the “experience and 
logic” test and the delicate policy balance that the Supreme Court 
and Congress achieved. 
This Comment contends that, under the “experience and logic” 
test, the First Amendment does not apply to prospective jurors’ identi-
ties during jury selection.
32
  Therefore, the First Amendment does not 
require that courts disclose prospective jurors’ identities to the public 
when the parties have not finished jury selection in a high-profile 
case that lacks safety concerns.  Part II of this Comment introduces 
the concept of the anonymous jury and the source of the district 
judge’s authority to empanel an anonymous jury.  Part II also 
presents the constitutional issues raised by an anonymous jury and 
the current case law addressing those issues.  Part III discusses the 
unprecedented decision in Wecht II, which creates a constitutional 
 
 29 See Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253 (“The common law [right of access] does not af-
ford as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and the public as 
does the First Amendment [right of access].”). 
 30 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 31 See generally id. 
 32 This Comment does not address the following issues:  (1) whether prospective 
jurors’ identities should be withheld from the public beyond empanelment; (2) 
whether prospective jurors’ identities should be anonymous to the parties, rather than 
the public, when the trial does not raise safety concerns; and (3) whether actual trial 
jurors’ identities should be anonymous in high-profile trials that do not raise safety 
concerns. 
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right to obtain the identities of prospective jurors.  Part IV analyzes 
the ways in which the Wecht II court misapplied the “experience and 
logic” test.  Part IV also evaluates the potential effects of Wecht II and 
how, if followed, it might substantially affect the balance achieved be-
tween media-access concerns and concerns for juror privacy and sys-
temic integrity. 
II.BACKGROUND ON ANONYMOUS JURIES AND COMMON 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
A. The History and Development of Anonymous Juries
33
 
A jury is anonymous when all information regarding the jurors is 
public, such as their ethnicity, age, level of education, and other 
background information, with the exception of the jurors’ identi-
ties.
34
  In the past, courts have hidden the identity of jurors from both 
the defendant and the public
35
 or only from the public.
36
  Courts also 
vary the duration of a jury’s anonymity, releasing the jurors’ names 
before empanelment, after empanelment, or not at all.
37
  Additional-
ly, courts diverge on the amount of information to withhold to keep 
the jury anonymous.  For example, while courts sometimes withhold 
only the names and addresses, other times courts also withhold the 
 
 33 Courts occasionally use the term “innominate” jury.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Bowman, 302 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “innominate” is the ap-
propriate label when the “parties knew everything about the jurors except their [last] 
names”).  Although the use of the term “anonymous” jury seems appropriate when 
nothing is known about the jurors because the term summons images of a “clandes-
tine, forbidden, and obscure” venire, the term “anonymous” is more commonly uti-
lized and is the term used in this Comment.  United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962, 
963 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 34 A juror’s identity consists of both the juror’s name and address.  See In re Globe 
Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 93 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In the case of many familiar 
names, an address as well as the name is necessary to identify the individual.”). 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding 
use of jury that was anonymous to the defendant and the public). 
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622–30 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(upholding use of anonymous jury where the defendant argued for closure and the 
media argued in favor of public access). 
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding 
use of anonymous jury and denial of media’s request for juror identities post-
verdict); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 725 (D. Mass. 1987) (permitting 
the withholding of the jurors’ names from the public for seven days after the verdict 
was handed down, to adequately protect the jurors’ privacy). 
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place of employment, ethnicity, or religion.
38
  This Comment deals 
with anonymous juries in federal criminal trials where the district 
court withholds the names and addresses of prospective jurors from 
the public prior to empanelment but discloses the names and ad-
dresses to the parties. 
Many scholars consider United States v. Barnes to be the first ex-
ample of a court upholding the use of an anonymous jury after the 
court empaneled and swore in the trial jurors.
39
  While Barnes might 
be the first case in which a court used an anonymous jury throughout 
the entire trial, the case law suggests that the Supreme Court and 
Congress permitted district courts to deny defendants the jurors’ 
names and addresses through the empanelment stage of trial before 
the 1970s.
40
  By extension, the Supreme Court and Congress must 
have permitted the district courts to withhold the jurors’ identities 
from the public as well.  Logistically, it is difficult to foresee how a 
court could withhold the jurors’ identities from the defendant while 
making the jurors’ identities available to the public. 
In Hamer v. United States,
41
 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the de-
fendant the list of prospective jurors, which contained the prospec-
tive jurors’ names and addresses, during voir dire.
42
  The court relied 
 
 38 See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1191–92 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(upholding district court’s order to withhold jurors’ names, addresses, and places of 
employment); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140–43 (2d Cir. 1979) (uphold-
ing anonymous jury where district court withheld jurors’ names, addresses, religion, 
and ethnicity); United States v. Melendez, 743 F. Supp. 134, 138–39 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(permitting the withholding of jurors’ first names, specific addresses, and places of 
employment but allowing disclosure of jurors’ last names, general area of residence, 
and types of employment). 
 39 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 140–41; see, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. 
Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exigent Circumstances Only, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 457, 457 (1999) (noting that Barnes was “the first fully anonymous jury in 
American History”).  In this case, the defendant stood accused of a number of se-
rious drug distribution charges, and in New York, such defendants had a well-
documented “history of attempts at influencing witnesses and jurors.”  Barnes, 604 
F.2d at 134 & n.3.  As a result, the court withheld the trial jurors’ names and ad-
dresses from the public and both parties for the entire trial out of a concern for juror 
safety rather than a concern over the biases that might result from excessive media 
coverage.  See id. at 140–41. 
 40 See infra notes 41–64 and accompanying text.   
 41 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 42 See id. at 277–79.  The Ninth Circuit also permitted the district judge to prevent 
defendant’s counsel from asking for the prospective jurors’ names and addresses 
during voir dire.  See id. 
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upon Pointer v. United States,
43
 in which Supreme Court Justice John 
Marshall Harlan, writing for the majority, stated, 
[T]he mode of designating and impaneling jurors for the 
trial of cases in the courts of the United States is within the 
control of those courts, subject only to the restrictions con-
gress [sic] has prescribed, and also to such limitations as are 
recognized by the settled principles of criminal law to be es-
sential in securing impartial juries for the trial of offenses.
44
 
The Hamer court observed that Congress only required that the de-
fendant receive a list of prospective jurors in trials for treason and 
other capital offenses.
45
  Given that the government indicted the de-
fendant for a noncapital offense, the court held that the jury could 
remain anonymous to the defendant through empanelment.
46
  More-
over, if the defendant did not have a right to know the jurors’ identi-
ties, then the public, by extension, must not have had a right to this 
information either. 
The Ninth Circuit was hardly the first court to hold that district 
judges had the discretion to keep prospective jurors anonymous by 
withholding lists of prospective jurors from defendants in noncapital 
cases.
47
  In 1891 in United States v. Van Duzee, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that persons indicted for noncapital offenses were not “en-
titled to a list of . . . jurors.”
48
  Even as far back as 1818, the Circuit 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania only required the deli-
very of prospective-juror lists in cases of treason and other capital of-
fenses and held that the right to juror lists did not extend to nonca-
 
 43 151 U.S. 396 (1894); see Hamer, 259 F.2d at 278. 
 44 Pointer, 151 U.S. at 407–08. 
 45 See Hamer, 259 F.2d at 278.  The court referenced 18 U.S.C. § 3432, which was 
amended in 1994 to include an exception, even in the case of treason and other cap-
ital offenses, “if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that providing 
the list may jeopardize the life or safety of any person.”  Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60025, 108 Stat. 1982 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2006)). 
 46 See Hamer, 259 F.2d at 276–79. 
 47 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 104 F.2d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1939) (upholding the 
trial judge’s order forbidding the clerk from distributing the jury list to anyone other 
than the marshal before the first day of trial and, even then, indicating that distribu-
tion on the first day of trial is within the “sound discretion of the trial court”); see also 
Stone v. United States, 324 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1963) (affirming Wilson); Spivey v. 
United States, 109 F.2d 181, 185–86 (5th Cir. 1940) (affirming Wilson). 
 48 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891). 
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pital offenses.
49
  In fact, district judges had the authority to deny juror 
lists to defendants in all noncapital cases since 1790 because Congress 
only gave defendants the right to a juror list in capital cases.
50
 
While Barnes was the first case to use an anonymous jury for the 
entire trial, the modern trend of empanelling anonymous juries, 
which Barnes represents, has strong roots in the concerns that the Su-
preme Court raised to the intense media coverage surrounding the 
trial of Dr. Sheppard in 1954.  Unlike the prior case law, Sheppard 
shifted the conflict from one between the trial court and the defen-
dant’s right to juror lists before empanelment to a conflict between 
the trial court and the media’s right to jurors’ identities before em-
panelment, after empanelment, and post-trial.
51
 
In Sheppard, the local authorities arrested the defendant, Dr. 
Sheppard, for murdering his wife.
52
  Although Dr. Sheppard main-
tained his innocence, the press vilified him both before and during 
the trial.
53
  The Supreme Court characterized the atmosphere of the 
trial as that of a “carnival.”
54
  Although the Supreme Court recognized 
 
 49 See United States v. Wood, 28 F.Cas. 754, 755 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818); see also Van 
Duzee, 140 U.S. at 173 (citing Wood with approval). 
 50 See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (“[A]ny person who shall 
be accused and indicted of treason, shall have . . . a list of the jury and witnesses . . . 
mentioning the names and places of abode of such witnesses and jurors, delivered 
unto him at least three entire days before he shall be tried for the same; and in other 
capital offences, shall have such copy of the indictment and list of the jury two entire 
days at least before the trial.”).  Although not the topic of this Comment, one won-
ders whether there was ever a common-law right to prospective-juror lists before em-
panelment given that Congress thought it was necessary to enact a statute creating 
this right in trials for treason and other capital offenses. 
 51 This Comment focuses exclusively on the use of an anonymous jury up until 
empanelment.  Consequently, this Comment primarily discusses the media’s right of 
access to prospective juror identities prior to the trial judge swearing in the actual trial 
jurors. 
 52 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 336, 341 (1966). 
 53 See id. at 338–49. 
 54 Id. at 358.  The “totality of the circumstances” were suggestive of the inherent 
unfairness of the trial.  Id. at 352–53.  The jurors 
were subjected to newspaper, radio and television coverage of the trial 
while not taking part in the proceedings.  They were allowed to go 
their separate ways . . . without adequate directions not to read or lis-
ten to anything concerning the case . . . .  The numerous pictures of 
the jurors, with their addresses, which appeared in the newspapers be-
fore and during the trial itself exposed them to expressions of opinion 
from both cranks and friends.  The fact that anonymous letters had 
been received by prospective jurors should have made the judge aware 
that this publicity seriously threatened the jurors’ privacy. 
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that a “responsible press” is the “handmaiden of effective judicial 
administration,”
55
 the Court also asserted that trial judges must ad-
dress the “pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficul-
ty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of jurors.”
56
  More-
over, the Court insisted that trial judges have the power to protect 
against prejudicial publicity.
57
 
In 1968, Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act of 
1968.
58
  Partially in response to Sheppard,
59
 Congress authorized each 
district court to adopt a jury-selection plan that would determine 
when the district judges must release the prospective jurors’ names to 
the parties and the public.
60
  Congress, however, did not require that 
each district court make the prospective jurors’ names public.
61
  In 
fact, Congress intended that the statute—28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7)—
codify the various existing practices in the country’s district courts.
62
  
 
Id. at 353.  “In light of this background . . . the arrangements made by the judge with 
the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of that ‘judicial serenity and calm to 
which (he) was entitled.’”  Id. at 355 (internal citation omitted). 
 55 Id. at 350 (“A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden 
of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field.  Its function in 
this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries.  
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the 
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to 
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”). 
 56 Id. at 362. 
 57 See id. at 357–63  (noting a number of options that the trial judge had at his 
disposal to reign in the excessive media coverage). 
 58 Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 
(2006)). 
 59 See United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2008) (Van 
Antwerpen, J., dissenting) (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d at 92 (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 11 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1801)); 
see supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 60 See § 1863(b)(7) (The “plan shall . . . fix the time when the names drawn from 
the qualified jury wheel shall be disclosed to [the] parties and to the public”). 
 61 See id. (“If the plan permits these names to be made public.” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 62 See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 11 (“It thereby permits the present di-
versity of practice to continue.”).  Since 1790, Congress required a particular proce-
dure for disclosing jurors’ identities to defendants in capital cases.  See Act of Apr. 30, 
1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2006).  Congress, howev-
er, did not specify when or if the public was entitled to such information in capital 
cases, and it did not specify anything with respect to noncapital cases.  In these cir-
cumstances, each district developed its own practice.  For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, instead of creating a set procedure for releasing jurors’ identities to the public, 
put the decision in the hands of the district courts, which acted according to the trial 
judge’s discretion.  See Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 278–80 (9th Cir. 1958) 
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Additionally, even if the plan adopted by the district court required 
the district judges to release prospective jurors’ names, Congress au-
thorized the district judges to “keep these names confidential in any 
case where the interests of justice so require.”
63
  Thus, when modern-day 
courts exercise their authority to empanel an anonymous jury, they 
rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7).
64
 
District courts aim to promote the use of public trials and thus 
are unlikely to use anonymous juries with any regularity.
65
  Nonethe-
less, when determining whether to withhold jurors’ identities, district 
courts look to any number of factors, including “(1) the defendant’s 
involvement in organized crime; (2) the defendant’s participation in 
a group with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendant’s past at-
tempts to interfere with the judicial process; (4) the fact that the de-
fendant faces a lengthy prison term or substantial fine; and (5) exten-
sive media publicity.”
66
  If these factors weigh in favor of anonymity, 
the district court will exercise its discretion by empaneling an ano-
nymous jury. 
 
(holding that congressional purpose and intent indicates that the courts are not re-
quired to release jurors’ names and addresses to the defendant before trials for “less-
er offenses”); see also Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 527–30 (9th Cir. 1959) 
(affirming Hamer in holding that the defendant was not entitled to the names and 
addresses of prospective jurors where the statutes and Constitution do not provide 
such a right). 
 63 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (2006) (emphasis added).  The statute does not specify 
up until what point in the trial courts may keep the names confidential.  Presumably, 
Congress intended that the courts interpret this timeframe’s length.  First, Congress 
codified existing practices, which suggests that Congress was permitting the practices 
already authorized by the courts.  Second, the statute permits the withholding of 
identities if justice so requires, which suggests that the courts make this determina-
tion on a case-by-case basis. 
 64 Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 3432, 28 U.S.C. § 1863 bestows district judges with the right 
to withhold jurors’ identities.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3432, with § 1863(b)(7).  The 
courts’ power under § 3432 is implied, rather than express, because § 3432 expressly 
grants defendants the right to juror lists only in trials for treason and other capital 
offenses.  See § 3432.  For example, the district court judge in United States v. Wecht 
empaneled an anonymous jury in reliance on his authority under § 1863(b)(7) and 
without relying on the failure of § 3432 to grant the right to a jury list to the defen-
dant.  United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (W.D. Penn. Dec. 21, 2007) (or-
der requiring empanelment of anonymous jury). 
 65 See AM. JURY PROJECT, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 
(AND COMMENTARY) 88 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
juryprojectstandards/The_ABA_Principles_for_Juries_and_Jury_Trials.pdf (suggest-
ing that open proceedings educate the public and instill confidence in the judiciary, 
which is in the interests of the courts not to erode, and anonymous juries thus should 
not be used absent “a genuine problem in a particular case”). 
 66 Id. at 87. 
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B. Sixth Amendment Challenges to Anonymous Juries 
Both defendants and the media may raise constitutional chal-
lenges to anonymous juries in criminal trials.  Defendants mount 
their challenges based on the Sixth Amendment “right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury.”
67
  As a result, defendants usual-
ly raise two arguments: (1) an anonymous jury violates the right to a 
public trial,
68
 and (2) an anonymous jury violates the guarantee of an 
impartial jury.
69
  Although controversies regarding defendant chal-
lenges under the Sixth Amendment are by no means settled issues,
70
 
the less-settled issues relate to the media’s right of access under the 
First Amendment. 
 
 67 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Supreme Court has found that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee to a public trial does not grant the media a right of access 
because the right to a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant, not the media.  
See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 381 (1979).  But some commentators 
have suggested that Gannett is ripe for reconsideration by the Supreme Court.  See 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 111–14 (1998) (“[E]ven if a defendant might 
prefer a closed proceeding (consider, for example, the British officers tried for their 
role in the Boston Massacre), the republican ideology underlying the public-trial 
clause [of the Sixth Amendment] overrode that preference in the name of demo-
cratic openness and education, public confidence, anticorruption, and truth seek-
ing.”). 
 68 See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (stating that the public trial 
ensures a fair trial and that the First and Sixth Amendments are equally protective of 
this right but that the public trial is mainly for the defendant’s protection).  While a 
defendant may waive the right to a public trial, the Sixth Amendment does not guar-
antee a defendant the right to a closed trial.  See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 
34–35 (1965).  The defendant does not have a constitutional right to closure because 
the “right to an open public trial is . . . [the] right of the accused and the public,” 
which means that the First Amendment right of access may keep the trial open to the 
public when the defendant waives the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  See 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986). 
 69 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (“An ano-
nymous jury raises the specter that the defendant is a dangerous person from whom 
jurors must be protected, thereby implicating the defendant’s constitutional right to 
a presumption of innocence.”).  The defendant’s right to select a jury of the defen-
dant’s choosing is another challenge to anonymous juries that relates to the guaran-
tee of an impartial jury.  See, e.g., United States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044, 1051–52 
(2d Cir. 1979) (denying defendant’s argument that without the prospective jurors’ 
addresses the defendant could not properly use the peremptory challenge). 
 70 The specific questions that are unsettled relate to whether this right of access 
extends to documents, evidence, and other information as opposed to the ability to 
attend and observe courtroom proceedings.  See, e.g., In re Nat’l Broad. Co., 828 F.2d 
340 (6th Cir. 1987) (determining whether access extends to documents used to dis-
qualify a judge from the case); United States v. Eaves, 685 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 
1988) (determining whether access extends to recordings used as evidence); United 
States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987) (determining whether access ex-
tends to jurors’ names and addresses after the verdict). 
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C. First Amendment Challenges to Anonymous Juries 
The press enjoys certain rights under the First Amendment,
71
 
which include the right to attend criminal trials.
72
  The media’s right 
of access to the courtroom flows from its position as the proxy of the 
public.
73
  The courtroom is “a public place,” and historically, the pub-
lic’s attendance at trials has “enhance[d] the integrity and quality of 
what takes place.”
74
  Without this access, the essential rights to free 
speech and a free press “could be eviscerated.”
75
  Because of the im-
portance of access, a rebuttable presumption of openness attaches to 
preliminary hearings
76
 as well as to voir dire proceedings.
77
 
Under Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), the 
Supreme Court requires courts to use a two-prong test—the “expe-
rience and logic” test—to determine whether the First Amendment’s 
presumption of openness attaches to a proceeding.
78
  Under the ex-
perience prong, the courts look to the history of the proceeding in 
issue to determine whether it has traditionally been open to the pub-
lic.
79
  The court, however, “does not look to the particular experience 
of any one jurisdiction, but instead ‘to the experience in that type or 
kind of hearing throughout the United States.’”
80
  The courts then 
examine the logic prong by evaluating whether public access will po-
sitively and “significant[ly]” affect the functioning of the proceed-
ing.
81
  If the two prongs weigh in favor of public access, then the First 
 
 71 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 72 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980). 
 73 See id. at 577 n.12; see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397–98 
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]his constitutional protection derives . . . because 
‘[i]n seeking out the news the press . . . acts as an agent of the public at large . . . .’”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 74 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578. 
 75 Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
 76 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 13 
(1986). 
 77 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510–
13 (1984). 
 78 478 U.S.  at 9. 
 79 See id. at 8 (The experience prong asks “whether the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public.”). 
 80 El Vocero de P. R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 81 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (The logic prong asks “whether public access 
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process”); see 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) 
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Amendment protects that proceeding, which means a presumption 
of openness attaches.
82
  Yet the presumption is not absolute.
83
 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), the Su-
preme Court indicated that an “overriding interest” could rebut the 
presumption of openness.
84
  Without giving any examples, the Su-
preme Court defined an “overriding interest” as any interest that “is 
essential to preserve higher values” than the value of openness.
85
  Dis-
trict courts must base closure on two specific findings—one showing 
the greater interest that closure will protect and a second showing 
that closure is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”
86
  By making 
specific findings, the district court ensures that an appellate court can 
accurately review the closure order.
87
 
III.THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO ANONYMOUS JURIES IN 
UNITED STATES V. WECHT 
In United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), the Third Circuit held that the 
media has a First Amendment right to the names and addresses of 
prospective jurors before voir dire even where the district judge or-
dered the empanelment of a jury that would be anonymous to the 
public but not to the defendant.
88
 
 
(noting that openness “enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the 
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system”) (internal ci-
tation omitted); see also United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) (list-
ing “six societal interests in open court proceedings that the Richmond Newspapers 
Court had found: [1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by 
providing the public with the more complete understanding of the judicial system; 
[2] promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be achieved only by 
permitting full public view of the proceedings; [3] providing a significant community 
therapeutic value as an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion; [4] 
serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial process to public 
scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the performance of all involved; and [6] discourage-
ment of perjury”). 
 82 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9. 
 83 See id.; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
 84 464 U.S. at 510; see also Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9–10 (reaffirming the rule 
on rebutting the presumption of openness set forth in Press-Enterprise I). 
 85 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id.; see also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606–07 (“Where . . . the State at-
tempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive in-
formation, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling govern-
mental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”). 
 88 See generally 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008).  Although the court says that the First 
Amendment right of access to jurors’ names and addresses attaches no later than 
empanelment, the court’s opinion implies that this right attaches much earlier, even 
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The U.S. Department of Justice brought corruption charges
89
 
against Dr. Cyril H. Wecht in January 2006 for unlawfully using “his 
public office as coroner of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, for pri-
vate financial gain.”
90
  The media took an immediate interest in Dr. 
Wecht’s case because he is a controversial forensics consultant and 
because he was charged in the 1970s with using the Allegheny County 
morgue for personal gain.
91
 
The parties agreed to use a twenty-four-page questionnaire with 
sixty-nine questions in the voir dire process in 2006 for the first sche-
duled trial.
92
  By the time the court mailed the questionnaires “to 300 
prospective jurors” in July 2006, the parties had also agreed that each 
prospective juror would return the completed questionnaire to the 
Jury Administrator.
93
  Under the jury-selection procedure, the Jury 
Administrator would distribute the questionnaire to the court and 
parties once the Jury Administrator removed and retained the last 
page of the questionnaire, which contained only “[t]he juror’s full 
name, home address, and signature.”
94
  As a result, the identity of the 
 
before voir dire.  The court was willing to give the Media-Intervenors access to the 
identity of the prospective jurors such that “the prospective jurors will not be ano-
nymous” and “the Media-Intervenors will have . . . information to investigate and 
detect possible improper bias in ‘for cause’ determinations.”  Id. at 243.  Yet “for 
cause” determinations occur during voir dire, which takes place prior to empanel-
ment.  The Media-Intervenors cannot possibly investigate the prospective jurors’ 
names during voir dire if the Third Circuit only requires disclosure at empanelment.  
Therefore, it appears that the Third Circuit believes that the right of access attaches, 
at the very least, during voir dire, if not earlier. 
 89 The Department of Justice filed the case in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  See id. at 224.  Judge Arthur Schwab was the presid-
ing judge.  See id. 
 90 Id. at 224 (internal citations omitted). 
 91 See Charlie Deitch, The Wecht Files, PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER, Dec. 20, 2007, avail-
able at  http://www.pittsburghcitypaper.ws/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A39852 
(explaining that Dr. Wecht is known for having challenged the Warren Commission 
on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was really a lone gunman, claimed on 20/20 that El-
vis Presley died from a drug overdose and not a heart problem, and asserted in a tab-
loid that Jon Benet Ramsey died accidentally at the hands of her father).  For more 
on the celebrity status of Dr. Wecht, see Famed Forensic Witness Fights Fraud Charges, 
USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-19-
celebrity-pathologist_N.htm; Dennis Roddy, Dr. Wecht’s Silent Treatment, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 2006, available at  http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06043/ 
653778-156.stm. 
 92 See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (W.D. Penn. Dec. 21, 2007) 
(order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  The last page of the questionnaire was the only page that contained the 
individual juror’s name and address.  Id. 
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jury pool would remain anonymous to all except the Jury Administra-
tor.  Neither the parties nor the media objected to this procedure.
95
 
Although the first scheduled trial never took place,
96
 Judge 
Schwab adopted virtually the same jury-selection procedure sua 
sponte in November 2007 for the second scheduled trial.
97
  Instead of 
mailing the questionnaires to the prospective jurors, Judge Schwab 
ordered that the Jury Administrator issue summonses to four hun-
dred prospective jurors whereby prospective jurors would report to 
the courthouse in groups of sixty and complete the questionnaires in 
person.
98
  Despite this difference in procedure, the jury would remain 
anonymous as the parties and the court established previously.
99
 
The parties would have the right to review the questionnaire af-
ter the Jury Administrator detached the last page and so long as the 
questionnaires remained in the courtroom.
100
  The parties would re-
ceive two days to review the questionnaires from each group of six-
ty—without each questionnaire’s last page—and prepare for Judge 
Schwab’s rulings on any “for cause” dismissals, all of which Judge 
 
 95 See id.; United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Given the intense local-media coverage at the time, it is hard to imagine that the me-
dia lacked notice of the jury-selection procedure in the first trial, especially because 
(1) the media was partially responsible for the delay in the first trial because of its 
appeal and (2) most of the disputes on appeal concerned First Amendment and 
common-law right-of-access issues.  See generally United States v. Wecht (Wecht I), 484 
F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 96 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 225 (“grant[ing] a stay of the trial pending [the 
court’s] resolution of the various appeals”) (internal citations omitted); see also Wecht 
I, 484 F.3d 194. 
 97 See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanel-
ment of anonymous jury).  The court needed to obtain a new venire because the ini-
tial venire was released based on an unrelated appeal.  See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 225.  
In selecting a new venire, Judge Schwab decided that adopting the same procedure 
and questionnaire without consulting the parties and the media was appropriate be-
cause “the Final Jury Questionnaire had already been approved, and the Jury Selec-
tion Procedure . . . had existed, without objection, for more than sixteen (16) months.”  
United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanelment of 
anonymous jury). 
 98 See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanel-
ment of anonymous jury).  Judge Schwab “consulted with other district judges and 
the Jury Administrator on the procedure.”  Id. 
 99 See id.  Judge Schwab reviewed the venire process used in “other high profile 
cases” and concluded that the questionnaires and procedure should otherwise re-
main in accordance with the jury-selection plan to which the parties agreed in the 
first scheduled trial.  Id.  
 100 See id.  
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Schwab would make in open court and on the record.
101
  Once at a 
pool of forty qualified jurors, only the parties would receive the last 
page of the questionnaire and thus know the names and addresses of 
the forty qualified jurors; the forty qualified jurors would remain 
anonymous to the public.
102
  The parties would then have the oppor-
tunity to make additional motions to disqualify any jurors for cause 
and to make peremptory challenges.
103
  This second round of “for 
cause” motions and peremptory challenges would also occur in open 
court.
104
 
During jury selection, Judge Schwab would conduct all proceed-
ings, including the “voir dire questioning of the final qualified pool 
of jurors,” in open court, but the media would not receive access to 
the questionnaires.
105
  Instead, the media would receive access to the 
questionnaires only at the conclusion of trial.
106
  Moreover, Judge 
Schwab would not allow the media to remove the questionnaires 
from the courtroom or view the last page containing the juror names 
and addresses.
107
  Nonetheless, Judge Schwab would permit any juror 
who wanted to reveal his or her identity to do so at the conclusion of 
trial.
108
 
Despite previously agreeing to juror anonymity in the first sche-
duled trial,
109
 Wecht objected to the removal of the last page from the 
 
 101 Id.  
 102 See id. 
 103 See id.  
 104 United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanelment 
of anonymous jury). 
 105 Id. 
 106 See id.  This Comment does not assess whether Judge Schwab appropriately de-
nied the media access to the questionnaires until the conclusion of trial.  Instead, 
this Comment contends that Judge Schwab had the authority to deny the media 
access at least until the conclusion of jury selection. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id.  On appeal, the Third Circuit did not consider whether Wecht waived 
his right to a public trial by agreeing to juror anonymity and then failing to object in 
the first trial.  Why the Third Circuit failed to consider this waiver issue is unclear.  
While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit permits waiver where the de-
fendant fails to object, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Cir-
cuits hold that a defendant cannot waive the right to a public trial under the Sixth 
Amendment unless clear evidence demonstrates that the defendant did so knowing-
ly.  See United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 154–55 (5th Cir. 2006); Walton v. Briley, 
361 F.3d 431, 433–34 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 359–60 
(2d Cir. 1997).  Where the Third Circuit stands on this circuit split is unclear.  Com-
pare United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir. 1949) (holding that the 
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questionnaires in the second trial.
110
  WPXI, Inc., PG Publishing 
Company, and Tribune Review Publishing Co. (collectively the “Me-
dia-Intervenors”) also filed a motion to challenge the order and re-
quested that Judge Schwab make the names and addresses of the four 
hundred prospective jurors available.
111
  In December 2007, Judge 
Schwab ruled that the initial order for an anonymous jury would 
stand.
112
 
The Media-Intervenors appealed to the Third Circuit.
113
  On 
January 9, 2008, the Third Circuit ordered Judge Schwab to disclose 
all four hundred prospective jurors’ names and addresses to the par-
ties and the Media-Intervenors before empaneling the jury.
114
  On 
August 1, 2008, the court issued its opinion.
115
 
B. Majority Opinion 
The majority of the court held that the Media-Intervenors’ First 
Amendment right of access “requires disclosure of jurors’ names.”
116
  
After briefly reviewing the “right of access jurisprudence,” the court 
set out to apply the “experience and logic” test from Press-Enterprise II 
to determine whether the names and addresses of prospective jurors 
 
defendant’s failure to object either personally or via counsel to the court’s exclusion 
of all spectators except the press from the courtroom constituted a waiver of the 
right to a public trial), with United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 604–
05 (3d Cir. 1969) (holding that the defendant did not waive the right to a public trial 
where the defendant’s attorney acquiesced to the clearing of the courtroom but told 
the court that the defendant might take issue later with the right to a public trial). 
 110 See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (W.D. Penn. Dec. 21, 2007) 
(order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury).  Wecht also moved for the voir 
dire of all four-hundred prospective jurors in open court.  See id.  By making this mo-
tion, Wecht wanted each prospective juror’s answer on the questionnaire repeated 
orally in court.  See id. 
 111 See id.  The Media-Intervenors, like Wecht, requested that the voir dire either 
take place in person in open court or that all of the questionnaires be read in open 
court.  See id. 
 112 See United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2008); see 
generally United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanel-
ment of anonymous jury).  Use of the term “anonymous jury” is a misnomer here be-
cause the jury is anonymous to all parties and the public until the venire is narrowed 
to forty prospective jurors.  At this time, the jury is no longer anonymous to the par-
ties because they receive the last page of the questionnaire.  The jury, however, re-
mains anonymous to the public throughout the remainder of the trial because the 
public never receives the last page of the questionnaire. 
 113 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 226. 
 114 See id. at 227. 
 115 See id. at 222. 
 116 Id. at 233. 
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“are subject to a presumptive right of public access under the First 
Amendment.”
117
 
Under the experience prong, the majority concluded that “ju-
rors’ names have traditionally been available to the public prior to 
the beginning of trial.”
118
  The court observed that in Press-Enterprise II, 
the Supreme Court looked at over one-thousand years of history 
when employing the experience prong.
119
  The court acknowledged 
that a tradition of concealing jurors’ names and addresses had devel-
oped over the past forty years in light of legislation by Congress.
120
  
Nonetheless, instead of factoring in the technological advances over 
the last forty years and their affect on how the media covers trials, the 
majority downplayed the significance of the last forty years relative to 
the last one thousand years by placing equal weight on all one thou-
sand years.
121
  The court found that small, local communities, where 
“most people have known each other,” have traditionally formed the 
pool from which the courts selected jurors.
122
  The court asserted that 
when it combined this small-community dynamic with the tradition of 
open voir dire,
123
 there is strong evidence that the public must have 
known the jurors’ identities.
124
  Consequently, the majority deter-
mined that a strong tradition of openness and a weak tradition of 
anonymous juries existed historically.
125
 
Under the logic prong, the majority concluded that “the benefits 
of public access” outweighed the risks associated with “public know-
ledge of jurors’ identities.”
126
  Beginning with the risks, the court 
stated that the dangers of public access include attempts by others to 
 
 117 Id. at 233–34. 
 118 Id. at 237. 
 119 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 236. 
 120 See id.  In this regard, the Court highlighted 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7).  See id.  
For more on 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7), see supra Part II.A. 
 121 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 237. 
 122 See id. at 235. 
 123 Some scholars have suggested that traditionally little opportunity existed to 
voir dire prospective jurors.  See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could 
the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 217 
(1981) (“[In the] eighteenth-century jury trial . . . the accused took the jury as he 
found it and virtually never employed his challenge rights.  Indeed, at the Old Bailey 
only two 12-man jury panels were used to discharge the entire caseload of as many as 
a hundred felony trials in a few days.  Each jury usually heard several unrelated cases 
before deliberating on any.”). 
 124 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 235. 
 125 See id. at 237. 
 126 Id. at 238–39. 
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influence or threaten jurors, resistance by jurors against participating 
in high-profile trials to protect their privacy, and dishonesty by jurors 
during voir dire to prevent the “disclosure of embarrassing informa-
tion.”
127
  The court, however, rejected each risk because releasing the 
jurors’ names after trial would not eliminate the threat.
128
  The major-
ity contended that releasing the jurors’ names after the trial could 
still subject jurors to retaliation, generate privacy fears, and create 
anxiety about revealing sensitive information.
129
 
Furthermore, the majority asserted that the public has the right 
to know who is exercising the power that decides “the fate of some-
one who [sic] the state has targeted for prosecution” because the 
“judicial system benefits from . . . public access.”
130
  First, the court in-
sisted that it only makes sense that the public know who is exercising 
this power given that the public has the right to attend voir dire pro-
ceedings and watch the trial, which is where the jurors use this pow-
er.
131
  Second, the court maintained that knowing the identity of 
those exercising this power verifies juror impartiality to the public, 
roots out corruption and bias, and instills public confidence in the 
system.
132
  Thus, the court asserted that public access has a democratic 
function in that it promotes public accountability.
133
 
The majority suggested that if a district court judge is concerned 
about excessive media coverage, then that judge should make find-
ings on a case-by-case basis to show a compelling government interest 
that would otherwise be impaired.
134
  In this case, the court did not 
find any compelling government interest because Judge Schwab 
failed to make any findings on the matter.
135
  As a result, the majority 
found that media access to the jurors’ names was crucial and the rea-
sons to withhold the jurors’ names were not compelling enough to 
overcome the findings in favor of public access by empanelment.
136
  
 
 127 Id. at 238. 
 128 See id. at 238, n.29. 
 129 See id. 
 130 Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 238.  
 131 See id. 
 132 See id. at 239. 
 133 See id. at 238. 
 134 See id. at 239.  The Third Circuit did not provide examples of a compelling go-
vernmental interest. 
 135 See id. at 239–42. 
 136 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 239; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text (not-
ing that the Third Circuit’s stated holding—that the right of access attaches by or no 
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Consequently, the court concluded that a First Amendment right of 
access attaches to prospective jurors’ names and addresses.
137
 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissent, Judge Van Antwerpen argued that the majority’s 
application of the “experience and logic” test ignored “a substantial 
volume of case law, statutes passed by Congress, and the established 
practices of many of this country’s courts.”
138
  Thus, the dissent rea-
soned that if the majority’s precedent is allowed to endure, it “will 
undoubtedly cause significant problems and delays in our district 
courts.”
139
 
Under the experience prong, Judge Van Antwerpen concluded 
that access to jurors’ names and addresses has not been traditionally 
available to the public and that the majority erred by failing to recog-
nize the traditional discretion district courts have over jury-selection 
procedures.
140
  The majority reached its conclusion that “the names of 
jurors must . . . have been common knowledge” merely because the 
voir dire proceeding was “traditionally open to the public.”
141
  Judge 
Van Antwerpen argued that while voir dire proceedings were tradi-
tionally open, the majority drew an incorrect inference when it con-
cluded that juror names were also available to the public.
142
 
Furthermore, the dissent maintained that the majority should 
have placed more emphasis on the recent traditions of judicial con-
trol that developed in response to the “increased media presence and 
 
later than empanelment—is incorrect because the majority implied that this right 
actually attaches, at least, during voir dire).  The Third Circuit’s opinion does not 
indicate that it considered remanding the case for factual findings.  If the Third Cir-
cuit remanded for this purpose, then Judge Schwab could have made specific find-
ings of fact to determine whether the government had a compelling interest that 
would support closure. 
 137 See id.; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 138 Wecht II, 527 F.3d at 243 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting). 
 139 Id. 
 140 See id. at 252. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See id.  Judge Van Antwerpen and the majority do not discuss the possibility 
that a party could ask prospective jurors their names during voir dire, assuming that 
the trial judge would permit such a question.  By doing so, the public would learn 
the names of the prospective jurors.  Still, if the parties learned the prospective ju-
rors’ names before voir dire because they had a juror list, then nothing guarantees 
that every attorney would ask or use every prospective juror’s name during voir dire 
to make all of the names available to the public.  Moreover, juror addresses would 
not likely be a subject of discussion if the attorneys had the addresses prior to voir 
dire. 
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role in judicial proceedings.”
143
  In particular, Judge Van Antwerpen 
highlighted the Supreme Court’s recognition of the pervasive mod-
ern media in Sheppard in 1966.
144
  Judge Van Antwerpen contended 
that Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
145
 in 
response to Sheppard and thereby codified the inherent discretionary 
powers that courts traditionally exercised throughout the United 
States to limit “prejudicial influences.”
146
  Finally, Judge Van Antwer-
pen noted that much of the case law since the 1960s recognizes the 
inherent power of district court judges to deny access to the names of 
prospective jurors.
147
  Consequently, the dissent concluded that ju-
rors’ names and addresses were not “historically known to the pub-
lic.”
148
 
Under the logic prong, the dissent concluded that the public 
disclosure of prospective jurors’ names before trial is not “significant-
ly important to the public’s ability to oversee the jury selection 
process” and does not “ensure the judicial system functions fairly and 
effectively.”
149
  Using a list of factors set out in the Third Circuit’s de-
cision in United States v. Smith,
150
 Judge Van Antwerpen argued that 
access to jurors’ names did not benefit the public before empanel-
ment.
151
  In fact, Judge Van Antwerpen contended that the public has 
 
 143 Id. at 255–56. 
 144 Wecht II, 527 F.3d at 255 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting). 
 145 Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 
(2006)). 
 146 Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 252–54 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  Judge Van Antwerpen suggested that the legislative history re-
lating to the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) supports the conclusion that a diversi-
ty of practices already existed regarding anonymous juries in 1968 and that Congress 
merely codified existing practice.  See id. at 253.  Moreover, Judge Van Antwerpen 
argued that judicial conferences in the 1960s and 1970s also found that anonymous 
juries were consistent with tradition.  See id. at 253–54. 
 147 See id. at 254–55. 
 148 Id. at 256. 
 149 Id. at 256–57. 
 150 123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997).  These factors are (1) “promotion of informed 
discussion of governmental affairs by providing the public with the more complete 
understanding of the judicial system;” (2) “promotion of the public perception of 
fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the proceed-
ings;” (3) “providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for 
community concern, hostility, and emotion;” (4) “serving as a check on corrupt prac-
tices by exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny;” (5) “enhancement of the 
performance of all involved;” and (6) “discouragement of perjury.”  Id. at 146–47 (ci-
tations omitted). 
 151 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 257–58 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting). 
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a stronger argument for access after trial because knowing the out-
come allows the public to ascertain the success of the process more 
effectively.
152
 
In addition, the dissent asserted that the “potential dangers of 
public access” are significant.
153
  Judge Van Antwerpen observed that 
the courts permit public access to trials to promote the public inter-
est, which Judge Van Antwerpen defined as “fair and orderly trials 
presided over by unbiased jurors.”
154
  Yet the dissent further observed 
that excessive pretrial access paradoxically endangers this public in-
terest.
155
  Judge Van Antwerpen assumed that the media will use ju-
rors’ names and addresses to write stories about these jurors.
156
  This 
creates the danger that research will involve speaking to jurors, or at 
least their families and friends during pretrial.
157
  Additionally, it 
creates the danger that the media will intrude upon prospective ju-
rors’ privacy even though the government requires private citizens to 
serve on juries.
158
  Of particular concern, friends and enemies of the 
defendant will be in a better position to “exert influence” over ju-
rors.
159
  Still, even in the absence of harassment, the media attention 
could make jurors less willing to serve and, if they serve, less willing to 
provide honest answers during voir dire.
160
 
The dissent concluded that the negatives of pre-empanelment 
access outweigh the benefits that public access will provide the sys-
tem.  In particular, Judge Van Antwerpen contended that access to 
jurors’ names could tarnish the impartiality of the jury, add to the 
struggle of finding “an uninformed jury,” and make the jurors vul-
nerable to harassment.
161
  Nonetheless, the dissent indicated that this 
balancing is difficult, and because it depends on the specifics of each 
case, the court should leave this determination to the judgment of 
district judges.
162
 
 
 152 See id. at 258 n.63. 
 153 Id. at 258. 
 154 Id. at 258–59.   
 155 See id. 
 156 See id. at 258. 
 157 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 258 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting).  
 158 See id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See id. at 257–58. 
 161 Id at 259.  
 162 See id. at 259 nn.66–67.  Judge Van Antwerpen argued that the majority 
stretched the case law to represent more than it really says because most of the ma-
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The dissent pointed to United States v. Black
163
 and Gannett Co. v. 
State
164
 as two examples in which courts considered high-profile cases 
similar to Wecht II and drew the conclusion that the “experience and 
logic” test cannot support a First Amendment right of access to pros-
pective jurors’ names and addresses before empanelment.
165
  In both 
cases, the parties knew the jurors’ identities and conducted voir dire 
in open court, but the judge withheld the prospective jurors’ names 
from the media.
166
  Judge Van Antwerpen highlighted that the court 
in each case did not find a historical tradition of public access to ju-
rors’ names because neither court inferred such a right simply from 
the fact that courts traditionally drew jurors from small local com-
munities.
167
  Additionally, Judge Van Antwerpen alluded to the Black 
court’s argument that access to the voir dire process satisfies the First 
Amendment while access to jurors’ names created too many dangers 
to the proper functioning of the jury.
168
  Supporting this argument, 
the dissent emphasized the Gannett court’s assertion that the connec-
tion between the goals of public access and knowledge of jurors’ 
names was weak.
169
  Consequently, Judge Van Antwerpen concluded 
that Black and Gannett, though not binding, represent the approach 
the majority should have taken in Wecht II.
170
 
IV.THE “EXPERIENCE AND LOGIC” TEST DOES NOT SUPPORT A 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES 
OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
Using the “experience and logic” test, the Third Circuit in Wecht 
II incorrectly held that the First Amendment provides the media with 
a right of access to the names and addresses of prospective jurors 
prior to empanelment.  First, the Third Circuit failed to consider the 
 
jority’s support came from cases that arose from post-trial access concerns rather 
than pretrial access concerns.  See id. at 259 n.66.   
 163 483 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (using the “experience and logic” test to 
hold that a newspaper did not have a First Amendment right of access to obtain ju-
rors’ names during trial). 
 164 571 A.2d 735 (Del. 1990) (upholding lower court’s order to withhold prospec-
tive jurors’ names in a high-profile murder trial because no First Amendment right 
of access to jurors’ names exists). 
 165 Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 259–60 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting). 
 166 See id. at 260 (citing Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 620–21; Gannett, 571 A.2d at 737). 
 167 See id. at 261 (citing Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 626; Gannett, 571 A.2d at 751). 
 168 See id. at 260 (citing Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 628). 
 169 See id. at 261 (citing Gannett, 571 A.2d at 751). 
 170 See id. at 261–62. 
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federal common-law right of access before searching for a new consti-
tutional right.  Second, the Media-Intervenors sought access to in-
formation contained within the prospective jurors’ questionnaires 
and not to the actual voir dire proceedings.  It is not clear that the 
First Amendment right of access even applies to documents while the 
common-law right of access is clearly applicable. 
Last, assuming that the First Amendment right of access does 
apply to documents, the Third Circuit nonetheless misapplied the 
“experience and logic” test.  Under the experience prong, the court 
reviewed common-law traditions but failed to recognize that public 
knowledge of prospective jurors’ names and addresses was historically 
a function of demographics, not a specific procedural guarantee.  
Additionally, the court completely ignored the country’s statutory 
traditions, which suggest that the statutes only entitled the defendant, 
and thus the public, to the identity of prospective jurors in capital-
offense trials.  The court also overlooked recent trends that have re-
sulted in greater judicial discretion over jury selection.  Under the 
logic prong, the Third Circuit highlighted legitimate policy concerns 
that would arise if it did not recognize a right of access, focusing on 
the need to hold jurors accountable to the public.  The court, howev-
er, failed to balance these concerns against the greater harm that ex-
tending the right of access to prospective jurors’ identities could 
cause in high-profile trials—namely, diminished district court discre-
tion over jury selection.  Consequently, the Third Circuit should not 
have held that the media has a right of access under the First 
Amendment to the names and addresses of prospective jurors before 
empanelment.
171
 
A. The Third Circuit Should Have Decided Wecht II on Common-Law 
Right of Access Grounds, Not on First Amendment Grounds 
The Third Circuit, in the interest of constitutional avoidance, 
should have attempted to address the Media-Intervenors’ access 
claims under the common-law right-of-access doctrine rather than 
creating a new constitutional right.  In Wecht II, the court quickly rec-
ognized and disregarded the Media-Intervenors’ argument that the 
public has a common-law right of access to the prospective jurors’ 
 
 171 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that the Third Circuit’s stated 
holding—that the right of access attaches no later than empanelment—is incorrect 
because the majority implied that this right actually attaches, at least, during voir 
dire). 
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questionnaires.
172
  Why the court ignored this common-law tradition 
is unclear and problematic.
173
 
The decision to apply the “experience and logic” test in Wecht II 
presumes that the First Amendment right of access provides a public-
access right to documents as well as to judicial proceedings.  The Me-
dia-Intervenors did not request access to the voir dire proceedings 
given that the jury selection was to occur in open court.
174
  Instead, 
the Media-Intervenors sought the names and addresses of the pros-
pective jurors by requesting the full prospective-juror questionnaires, 
including the last page with the jurors’ names and addresses.
175
 
When the Supreme Court created the “experience and logic” 
test, it relied on a series of cases establishing a First Amendment right 
of access to courtroom proceedings in criminal trials and, by exten-
sion, the proceedings surrounding the trial, such as voir dire.
176
  The 
Supreme Court, however, has yet to extend its right-of-access juri-
sprudence under the First Amendment from proceedings to docu-
ments.  While some courts have implied a right of access to court 
documents under the First Amendment, other courts have not fol-
lowed suit.
177
  If the First Amendment does not cover court docu-
ments, then the Wecht II court applied the wrong law. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court has established a right to 
judicial documents and information under the federal common-law 
right-of-access doctrine.
178
  Although the Supreme Court has not 
 
 172 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 233 n.21. 
 173 The court stated that the Media-Intervenors failed to develop this point in 
their brief.  See id. at 233.  For unknown reasons, the court did not ask the parties to 
develop their arguments on the common-law access question further. 
 174 See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (W.D. Penn. Dec. 21, 2007) 
(order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury). 
 175 See id.  
 176 See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 
1 (1986) (declaring right of access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (declaring right of access to 
voir dire); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (declaring 
right of access to criminal trials). 
 177 Compare Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (permitting 
access to filed documents in a civil case because the First Amendment right of access 
to criminal trials should also apply to civil cases), with United States v. McVeigh, 119 
F.3d 806 (10th Cir. 1997) (disallowing access on First Amendment grounds to filed 
document sealed by the court in a criminal proceeding), and United States v. Yonk-
ers Bd. of Educ., 747 F.2d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the First Amend-
ment does not guarantee access beyond the right to attend trials). 
 178 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
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flushed out this common-law right in detail, the Court has held that 
the public has a common-law right “to inspect and copy public 
records and documents, including judicial records and docu-
ments.”
179
  The purpose of this common-law right of access is to “mon-
itor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty, 
and respect for our legal system.”
180
  This right is “not absolute,” but 
the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is difficult to distill . . . 
or to identify all the factors to be weighed in determining whether 
access is appropriate.”
181
  As a result, district courts should exercise 
their discretion “in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of 
the particular case.”
182
 
The fact that the Third Circuit ignored the common-law right of 
access is puzzling and creates a quandary for district courts that rely 
upon judicial discretion to cope with high-profile trials.  First, the 
Media-Intervenors sought the prospective jurors’ questionnaires, but 
the First Amendment right of access does not necessarily apply to 
documents, while the common-law right of access clearly does apply.  
Second, the Supreme Court places discretion squarely with the dis-
trict courts, while the Third Circuit removes that discretion.  Under 
the common-law right of access, district courts may restrict access be-
cause of prejudicial publicity before trial, third parties’ privacy inter-
ests, and impairments to the trial’s efficiency.
183
  Moreover, because 
appellate courts review district courts’ rulings on the common-law 
right of access under an abuse-of-discretion standard, appellate re-
view should pay great deference to lower courts’ rulings on common-
law access issues.
184
  By ignoring the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s 
obvious preference to honor district court discretion, the Wecht II de-
cision creates questions as to how much power the district courts have 
to control the publicity inherent in high-profile trials. 
B. Misapplying the “Experience and Logic” Test in Wecht II 
Assuming that the First Amendment covers the Media-
Intervenors’ request for documents—in this case the juror question-
naires—then the Third Circuit was correct to use the “experience 
 
 179 Id. at 597–99. 
 180 In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1303, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 181 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598–99. 
 182 Id. at 599. 
 183 See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1047–50 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 184 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. 
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and logic” test in Wecht II, but the Wecht II decision did not apply the 
test correctly.  Under the experience prong, the court failed both to 
unearth a history of public access concerning prospective jurors’ 
names and addresses and to consider this history based on the rise of 
modern media and communications technology.
185
  Under the logic 
prong, the Court failed to properly account for the risks that public 
access poses both to prospective jurors and to the criminal-justice sys-
tem in high-profile trials.  If the Third Circuit properly accounted for 
these risks, the Court could not have claimed that disclosure of the 
prospective jurors’ names and addresses before empanelment would 
have a “significant positive role in the functioning of the [jury-
selection] process.”
186
  As a result, the balance of the experience and 
logic prongs weighs against a First Amendment right of access and, 
thus, against a constitutional presumption of access to prospective ju-
rors’ names and addresses.
187
 
 
 185 The court is not formally required to emphasize one part of history over 
another, but this Comment contends that the court should view all one thousand 
years in context by accounting for historical trends.  See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, Note, 
What Ever Happened to “The Right to Know”?: Access to Government-Controlled Information 
Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1131 (1987) (noting that a histori-
cal analysis is “inconsistent with the . . . established approach to first amendment 
[sic] adjudication” because interpreting the First Amendment “‘in light of current 
values and conditions’ . . . free[s] the Court from . . . historical assumption[s]”).  For 
example, one thousand years ago, media coverage was less of a concern because ju-
rors were self-informing fact finders chosen due to their possession of knowledge 
about the case.  See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 
17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 314 (1973).  Yet the influence of the media has rightly oc-
cupied the courts’ attention over the last half-century because (1) the justice system 
today does not want jurors with prior knowledge of the case and (2) the pervasive-
ness of modern media coverage is likely to make the task of eliminating jurors with 
prior knowledge more difficult.  Thus, while this Comment argues for greater focus 
on more recent traditions, it does not contend that the historical analysis of the ex-
perience prong lacks relevance in the right-of-access inquiry.  But see, e.g., Wood, su-
pra note 13, at 3–4 (“I find the Court’s reliance on history troubling for at least two 
reasons: First, I believe that the Court has given insufficient weight to the dramatic 
changes in the criminal judicial process since the drafting of the First Amendment—
changes that make historical experience, divorced from its context, misleading ra-
ther than enlightening.  Second, I fear that the Court’s heavy emphasis on history 
encourages a reliance on analogy at the expense of principled reasoning.”). 
 186 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) 
(emphasis added). 
 187 In discussing the First Amendment right of access in the following sections, 
this Comment assumes the right of access extends beyond attendance at proceedings 
to include access to documents and information.  Nonetheless, whether the First 
Amendment right of access extends to documents and information is not a settled 
issue.  See supra Part IV.A. 
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1. The Third Circuit Misapplied the Experience Prong 
The experience prong requires that “the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public.”
188
  While the 
Wecht II court found “public knowledge of jurors’ names” to be “a 
well-established part of American judicial tradition,”
189
 the historical 
record proves otherwise.  Public knowledge of jurors’ names and ad-
dresses was a function of community size rather than a procedure 
employed by the courts and designed to disclose jurors’ identities to 
the public.
190
  When community sizes increased, the public lost its 
ability to recognize every juror because the community was too big 
for everyone to recognize everyone else.
191
  Moreover, courts histori-
cally have lacked a procedure for disclosing jurors’ identities to the 
public if the identities were not available from the parties’ interac-
tions with the prospective jurors during voir dire.
192
  Thus, the histori-
cal record highlighted by the court would not yield public knowledge 
of jurors’ names and addresses today; an additional act would be ne-
cessary to identify the jurors if voir dire did not reveal their identi-
ties.
193
  As a result, the traditional process of disclosing jurors’ identi-
ties was not a specific procedural guarantee but merely the 
coincidental and visual recognition of jurors by other members of the 
community during an open courtroom proceeding. 
During the eighteenth century, American courts drew jurors 
from the small, local community where the crime occurred,
194
 as was 
the tradition in England.
195
  The venire was composed of white, prop-
erty-owning men.
196
  Thus, out of the small number of people living in 
a local community, even a smaller number were qualified to serve as 
 
 188 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
 189 United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 190 See infra notes 194–203 and accompanying text. 
 191 See infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
 192 See id. 
 193 See infra notes 204–07 and accompanying text. 
 194 AMAR, supra note 67, at 88–93; Daniel D. Blinka, “This Germ of Rottedness”: Feder-
al Trials in the New Republic, 1789–1807, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 135, 139 (2003); see 
ABRAMSON, supra note 20, at 22–36 (tracing the history of juries during the constitu-
tional ratification period and the prevalence of debates on whether to maintain the 
tradition of drawing jurors from the local communities). 
 195 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *344. 
 196 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in 
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 878–82 (1994); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 
20, at 29 nn.56–57 (noting that Vermont was the only exception to the property-
ownership requirement when the Constitution was ratified in 1787). 
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jurors.
197
  Because the spectators watched the voir dire proceedings,
198
 
“everybody knew everybody on the jury,” and all trial spectators, by 
virtue of the openness of the proceedings, could observe which jurors 
the parties chose and which jurors the court excused.
199
 
The trial spectators, however, acquired knowledge of the pros-
pective jurors’ identities merely by accident, not by right.
200
  As the 
spectators watched the proceedings, they recognized individuals that 
they previously knew rather than acquiring the identity of each juror 
through some device in the proceeding or access to specific docu-
ments.
201
  In other words, the procedural steps of jury selection never 
 
 197 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 196, at 877.  The property-ownership re-
quirements reduced the number of qualified jurors by seventy-five percent in Eng-
land.  See id.  While the effect of this requirement in the United States was far less 
prohibitive because of the availability of land, at least twenty-five percent of the male 
population was not qualified to sit on a jury.  See id.  When considering the fact that 
women, if assumed to make up fifty percent of the population, could not serve, then 
the combination reduced the number of qualified jurors to approximately thirty-
eight percent of the population. 
 198 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 506–
08 (1984).  In England, “[t]he indictment was . . . read; if the accused pleaded not 
guilty, the jurors were called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant was 
allowed to make his challenges.”  Id. at 507 (citation omitted).  As a result, “the en-
tire trial proceeded ‘openly . . . , and as many [others] as be present may heare.’”  Id.  (ci-
tation omitted).  The colonials transplanted this process of “[p]ublic jury selection” 
in the American Colonies, and thus, it “was the common practice in America when 
the Constitution was adopted.”  Id. at 508.   
 199 In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988).  Given that membership in 
the qualified juror population—being male and a property owner—required all the 
marks of privilege, such exclusivity also conceivably led to an individual’s promi-
nence among the local citizenry.  See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 196, at 877; see also 
supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 200 Some sources indicate that after the defendant pleaded not guilty, prospective 
jurors were “called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant was allowed to 
make his challenges.”  Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 507.  This might indicate that the 
court called the jurors by name.  Yet even if that is the case, this proves that juror 
names were used somewhere at some point, but it does not indicate how consistently 
most courts followed this process.  See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also 
infra note 202 and accompanying text.  Additionally, the order of events suggests a 
problem with the process, which moves from calling forth the juror to exercising a 
challenge.  A juror name, however, is not nearly enough information on which to 
exercise a challenge.  Thus, either this recitation of the process is inaccurate or the 
prospective jurors’ identities were already known to those in the courtroom. 
 201 See In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[E]verybody knew eve-
rybody on the jury and we may take judicial notice that this is yet so in many rural 
communities throughout the country.  So, everyone can see and know everyone who 
is stricken from a venire list or otherwise does not serve.  Even in the case before us, 
the entire voir dire proceeding was in open court . . . .  But the anonymity of life in 
the cities has so changed the complexion of this country that even the press . . . does 
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included a specific method designed to make the names public.
202
  In-
stead, the public drew the conclusions themselves as a matter of coin-
cidence.  The likelihood that the public knew the jurors simply by re-
cognizing people already known to them seems even more probable 
when considering the makeup of the juror pool—white men who 
owned property within a very small community.
203
 
Importantly, the Wecht II majority, in its historical analysis, failed 
to distinguish between a tradition of making the jurors’ names availa-
ble by way of access to documentation and a tradition whereby the 
public simply recognized jurors by virtue of an open proceeding.  As 
the court explained, juror anonymity used to be rare because “shiel-
ding their identity simply” was too difficult because community size 
precluded this possibility.
204
  Although the size of the local community 
has changed,
205
 the practice of open voir dire proceedings and the 
lack of a formal procedure for disclosing jurors’ identities to the pub-
lic have remained unchanged.
206
  Thus, if this tradition of jury selec-
tion continued, then jurors’ names would not be available without 
some further overt act by the court, which would not have been a part 
of a traditional court proceeding.
207
 
 
not know and cannot easily obtain the names of the jurors and of the veniremen and 
women who did not serve in this case.”). 
 202 For example, unlike the “medieval law . . . in the law books of the time,” the 
actual records from the Old Bailey indicate that voir dire was rare in practice, which 
buttresses the assertion that there was little aside from coincidence that would allow 
the public to recognize the prospective jurors.  John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial 
Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.  263, 275–76 (1978).  In the Old Bailey, a single 
jury would routinely hear a series of cases and then deliberate on all of them at the 
same time.  See id. at 275.  Moreover, unlike the “ad hoc trial commissions,” the de-
fendants at the Old Bailey rarely exercised a challenge to prospective jurors.  Id.  The 
lackluster use of challenges makes sense because “in practice the prosecution and 
defense took the jury as they found it” and “no time was spent probing [prospective] 
jurors’ backgrounds and attitudes.”  Id. at 279. 
 203 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 196, at 878–82; see also ABRAMSON, supra note 
20, at 29 nn.56–57. 
 204 David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and 
Policy Options 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 30 (1997). 
 205 See In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988).    
 206 See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 
501 (1984). 
 207 Admittedly, some insignificant practices become so commonplace that they 
take on their own importance.  Thus, historical accidents can take on constitutional 
significance.  See Hayes, supra note 185, at 1132 (“[M]any criminal proceedings lack a 
common-law tradition of openness but have grown so in importance under modern 
practice that closing them defeats the purpose of allowing access to trials.”).  For ex-
ample, public knowledge of trial jurors’ identities ensures their accountability to the 
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Aside from common-law traditions, statutory traditions are also 
relevant.  First, defendants, as distinguished from the media, have 
historically had a statutory right to know the jurors’ names within cer-
tain limited contexts.  For example, in both England and the United 
States, defendants had—and still have—a statutory right to know the 
names and addresses of the jurors in treason trials because the statute 
provided a right to the list of jurors prior to empanelment.
208
  Given 
the political nature of treason prosecutions,
209
 defendants should 
have the names of prospective jurors in voir dire for protection 
against government abuses.  Although Congress specifically granted 
this right to defendants, Congress did not provide a right in the sta-
tute to the public.  This is particularly significant given that the First 
Congress was responsible for passing this particular treason act as well 
as the First Amendment.
210
  In fact, the First Congress debated and 
passed the First Amendment before the treason act.
211
  As such, the 
First Amendment was a concept well understood by Congress at the 
 
public.  See infra Part IV.B.2.b.  Nonetheless, the analysis under the experience prong 
has to do with whether a practice has been available historically.  The “experience 
and logic” test deals with questions about the importance of a practice under the log-
ic prong.  Hayes, supra note 185, at 1132 (noting that a “major problem with the his-
tory prong is that there is no logical link between the history factor and the first 
amendment rationale underlying the right of access”). 
 208 See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (“[A]ny person who shall be 
accused and indicted of treason, shall have . . . a list of the jury . . . mentioning the 
names and place of abode of such . . . jurors, delivered unto him at least three entire 
days before he shall be tried for the same; and in other capital offences, shall have 
such copy of the indictment and list of the jury two entire days at least before the tri-
al.”); Treason Act of 1708, 7 Ann., c. 21, §11 (Eng.) (“[W]hen any person is indicted 
for high treason, or misprision of treason, a list . . . of the jury, mentioning the 
names, profession, and place of abode of the . . . jurors, [shall] be . . . given . . . to the 
party indicated.”). 
 209 See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 20, at 38–39 (discussing the politics surrounding 
Aaron Burr’s treason trial).  President Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr were known 
to have held animosity for one another.  See id.  When Burr was on trial for treason 
during Jefferson’s presidency, “the federal marshal who summoned the grand jury 
had acted illegally by choosing substitutes at his own discretion for any persons ex-
cused; the proper procedure . . . was to choose from among the bystanders at court. . 
. .  [Chief Justice John Marshall] agreed with Burr that the federal marshal’s proce-
dure smacked of handpicking the grand jury.”  Id. 
 210 The First Congress sent the Bill of Rights to the states in September 1789.  1 
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 88–89 (Sept. 25, 
1789) [hereinafter SENATE JOURNAL].  In April 1790, the First Congress passed the 
treason act.  See generally Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112.  The First Con-
gress met from 1789 to 1790.     
 211 See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112; 1 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 
210, at 88–89. 
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time Congress passed the treason act.
212
  If Congress wanted to imbue 
the public and, in particular, the press with a right to juror informa-
tion based on the First Amendment, it certainly had ample opportu-
nity to do so. 
Second, the legislative history indicates that Congress codified 
existing judicial practices when it passed the Jury Selection and Ser-
vice Act of 1968.
213
  Congress expressly authorized the district courts 
to withhold prospective or actual jurors’ names such that the jurors 
would remain anonymous to the public if “justice so requires.”
214
  If 
Congress was codifying existing practice, then public access to jurors’ 
names was not part of a well-established tradition in high-profile cas-
es.
215
  In fact, as the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System 
made clear, the tradition might be one that favored judicial discre-
tion to withhold jurors’ names and addresses in cases that “attract 
unusual publicity.”
216
  By ignoring Congress’s findings as to the histor-
ical records and reaching its own conflicting conclusions, the Wecht II 
majority comes close to encroaching upon a uniquely legislative func-
tion. 
In addition to the long-term common-law and statutory tradi-
tions, the modern trend since the 1960s has been one of increasing 
judicial discretion in recognition of the “pervasiveness of modern 
communications.”
217
  Beginning after World War II, the potential ef-
fect of media coverage on a trial changed because of improved com-
 
 212 Contra Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 726 n.27 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“[L]eaders who have drafted and voted for a text are eminently capable of vi-
olating their own rules. . . .  [Failing to recognize this] would misguidedly give au-
thoritative weight to the fact that . . . Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Act, 
which indisputably violated our present understanding of the First Amendment.”). 
 213 Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 
(2006)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 11 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1792, 1801. 
 214 § 1863(b)(7).  The statute does not suggest how long the courts may withhold 
the jurors’ identities.  Presumably, Congress intended that the courts interpret this 
timeframe’s length.  First, Congress codified existing practices, which suggests that 
Congress was permitting the practices already authorized by the courts.  See H.R. REP. 
NO. 90-1076, at 11.  Second, the statute permits the withholding of identities if justice 
so requires, which suggests that the courts make this determination on a case-by-case 
basis.  § 1863(b)(7). 
 215 The phrase “justice so requires” may be understood as being equivalent to the 
test for overcoming a First Amendment presumption of openness.  More likely, how-
ever, it should be understood as being consistent with the common-law presumption 
of openness, which relies on a trial judge’s discretion to overcome this presumption. 
 216 FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 409–12. 
 217 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). 
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munications technology and the media’s enhanced ability to reach a 
national audience.
218
  By virtue of this shift, the “public” knowledge of 
jurors’ identities took on a new meaning, changing from the small, 
local community to the national audience.  The Supreme Court rec-
ognized this change and emphasized the importance of a trial judge’s 
discretion in countering the invasiveness of the media.
219
  Soon after 
the Supreme Court recognized the importance of trial-court discre-
tion, Congress codified the existing discretionary powers of district 
judges.
220
  Moreover, the courts have followed these rules ever since 
the 1960s.
221
  Consequently, even if the existence of a tradition of 
public knowledge of jurors’ names and addresses before the 1960s is 
questionable, a tradition of judicial discretion against such disclosure 
has clearly existed since then.
222
  Thus, the increasingly national focus 
of television, radio, and new media, such as blogging, has augmented 
the dangers of public disclosure of jurors’ identities.
223
 
 
 218 See generally MICKELSON, supra note 13.  
 219 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358–63. 
 220 See § 1863(b)(7). 
 221 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Wong, 40 F.3d 1347 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 
1988); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987).  But see, e.g., 
Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 
F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Mohammed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
 222 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–77 (2003) (indicating that modern 
trends are equally important when looking at our legal traditions).  But see Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–28 (1997) (indicating that modern trends are 
not a part of our country’s historical tradition). 
 223 For some examples of the new dilemmas that trial courts face in light of ad-
vancing technologies, see Deirdra Funcheon, Jurors and Prosecutors Sink a Federal Case 
Against Internet Pharmacies, BROWARD-PALM BEACH NEW TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009, 
http://www.browardpalmbeach.com/2009-04-23/news/jurors-and-prosecutors-sink-
a-federal-case-against-internet-pharmacies/www.wolfgangsvault.com (discussing a mi-
strial resulting from eight out of twelve jurors using Google, some from home and 
some from cell phones, to conduct their own research on the defendants and the 
pharmaceutical medications discussed during trial); John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to 
Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1,  available 
at 2009 WLNR 5102471 (noting the recent phenomenon of jurors turning to Black-
berries and iPhones to obtain information relevant to the case that was not actually 
presented or was expressly excluded from the jury). 
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2. The Third Circuit Misapplied the Logic Prong 
The logic prong requires that public access play “a significant 
positive role in the functioning of the particular process.”
224
  The 
court found that “the judicial system benefits from a presumption of 
public access to jurors’ names” prior to empanelment,
225
 but a closer 
look at the policy justifications suggests that a blanket presumption of 
disclosure would create more harm than good.
226
 
a. Effect of the Presumption of Openness on Jurors and 
the Justice System 
Prospective jurors and the criminal-justice system assume a com-
bination of risks in high-profile trials when the public and the media 
can access their names and addresses.  These risks include (1) the 
risk of intimidation, (2) the risk of invasion of privacy, and (3) the 
risk of media influence. 
Access to jurors’ names in high-profile cases poses the risk that a 
friend or enemy of the defendant will intimidate the jurors or that 
the press will invade the jurors’ privacy.  These are likely the two 
greatest fears prospective jurors have in high-profile cases.
227
  Al-
though the fear of intimidation is merely an unsubstantiated fear ab-
sent actual intimidation, public access to jurors’ names and addresses 
certainly creates the opportunity for intimidation and thus increases 
the risk that it will occur.
228
  The Third Circuit argued that district 
 
 224 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 
(1986). 
 225 United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 238 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 226 The logic prong acts as a balancing test because courts weigh the benefits of 
public access against the risks of releasing prospective jurors’ identities.  See supra 
Parts II.C, III.B.  Importantly, however, this balancing does not result in an objective 
weighing of analogous interests.  Instead, the interests on each side are “incommen-
surate.”  Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., concurring).  This leaves courts with “no objective criteria for . . . comparing the 
interests at stake.”  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 
96 YALE L.J. 943, 972 (1987).  Thus, balancing requires that courts assign a value to 
the various interests and use these assigned values to compare and contrast.  See id. at 
972–73.  Consequently, the logic prong can prove to be particularly difficult because 
subjectivity plays a role; that is, consistent outcomes from court to court depend 
upon each court assigning relatively similar values to each incommensurate interest. 
 227 See In re S.C. Press Ass’n, 946 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1991) (authorizing voir dire 
without the presence of the media where juror fears made honesty impossible with 
media present). 
 228 Two types of cases are candidates for an anonymous jury: the organized-crime 
trial and the high-publicity trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 613 
(5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he paradigmatic situation justifying an anonymous jury is an or-
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courts release the jurors’ names at the end of trial anyway, and there-
fore, jurors will maintain these fears in anticipation of the informa-
tion’s release because defendant retaliation is possible after the tri-
al.
229
  The Third Circuit’s analysis, however, is problematic.  First, 
district courts would be ill-advised not to address jurors’ fears before 
trial simply because jurors might cling to these fears after the trial 
concludes.
230
  Second, the court failed to make the distinction be-
tween intimidation and retaliation.
231
  A defendant who intimidates 
intends to affect the verdict, whereas a defendant who retaliates seeks 
to avenge a guilty verdict and not to influence the deliberation 
process.  Naturally, most defendants would want to prevent a guilty 
verdict, and thus, the risk of intimidation is present to an extent with 
any defendant.
232
  The defendant, however, must harbor an addition-
al motivation beyond the desire for freedom—like revenge—for the 
defendant to seek retribution.  In addition, why the court believed 
that the defendant would blame prospective jurors, whom the court did 
not empanel as trial jurors, for a guilty verdict is unclear.  Thus, the 
likelihood of retaliation is not the same as compared to intimidation 
during trial.
233
 
As for privacy fears, jurors manifest this fear during voir dire 
proceedings because prospective jurors want to guard their reputa-
 
ganized crime trial, where the safety of the jurors becomes an overriding concern.  
This is not to say, however, that the withholding of juror information is appropriate 
only in organized crime cases.  We have previously approved of an anonymous jury 
when the case attracts unusually large media attention and arouses deep passions in 
the community.”) (citations omitted).  The former clearly raises far more substantial 
safety issues than the latter.  See id. at 613–14.  Because this Comment is only con-
cerned with high-profile trials, the remainder of this Comment does not focus on 
cases where juror safety is a legitimate concern. 
 229 See United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 238 n.29 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 230 Arguably, district courts would amplify jurors’ fears if the jurors understood 
that courts planned to do nothing at all. 
 231 See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 238. 
 232 One tool that trial judges have at their disposal is sequestering the jury.  This 
Comment, however, focuses on prospective jurors, not actual jurors.  Thus, the more 
extreme action for a trial judge would be to sequester a pool of prospective jurors 
rather than just maintaining their anonymity until the actual jurors are selected and 
empaneled. 
 233 Logically, prospective jurors do not have anything to fear, but people’s motiva-
tions for fear are not always logical.  As a result, prospective jurors may still fear retal-
iation or intimidation when arriving at the courthouse even though the likelihood of 
harm is low and the parties have not selected any of the actual trial jurors.  Fear of 
intimidation, however, is usually less of an issue in high-profile trials that lay outside 
the organized-crime or gang trial context.  See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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tions and prevent the release of any sensitive information.
234
  Some-
times these privacy interests reach a point that warrants withholding 
jurors’ names from the public to shield the jurors from embarrass-
ment.
235
  Critics of the anonymous jury argue that prospective jurors 
are more honest about their biases and experiences when jurors’ 
names are public because of the jurors’ concern for their reputa-
tions.
236
  Yet jurors lie out of concern for their reputations.
237
  By lying, 
jurors protect their reputations because the sensitive or embarrassing 
information remains private and undisclosed.
238
  Again, the Wecht II 
court argued that when the district courts release the jurors’ names 
after trial, the jurors’ information will be public and jurors will fear 
this eventual release.
239
  But far less interest in the trial will exist once 
the trial is over.
240
  Television stations and newspapers are businesses 
that must turn a profit.  Thus, these media outlets will respond to the 
decrease in public interest.  By extension, far less interest in prospec-
tive jurors will exist after empanelment, which means that the media 
outlets will respond similarly.  Consequently, the media is less likely 
to pursue investigations as vigorously and invade either the trial or 
 
 234 See generally Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonym-
ous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 126–30 (1996) (discussing general 
sources of jurors’ fears). 
 235 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 512 
(1984) (“[A] valid privacy right may rise to a level that part of the transcript should 
be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect the person from embarrass-
ment.”). 
 236 See, e.g., Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 237 See Richard Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 451, 
460 (1991) (stating that jurors in the study withheld information because they sought 
“to avoid embarrassment” and that “techniques such as pre-voir dire questionnaires 
or sequestering jurors for sensitive questions should lead to more truthful res-
ponses”).  Lying is even more likely to occur when the juror is predisposed to react-
ing poorly to increased scrutiny.  See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and 
the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1710 n.240 (2006) 
(citing Linda L. Marshall & Althea Smith, The Effects of Demand Characteristics, Evalua-
tion Anxiety, and Expectancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J. PSYCHOL. 205, 213 
(1985)). 
 238 See generally Seltzer et al., supra note 237.  Arguably, the information will be-
come public anyway if the press is able to investigate.  Yet this is only a deterrent if 
the individual juror believes that someone will catch him or her in a lie. 
 239 See United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 238 n.29 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 240 See United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 725 (D. Mass. 1987) (permitting 
the withholding of the jurors’ names from the public for seven days after the verdict 
was delivered because the decrease in media attention would adequately protect the 
jurors’ privacy). 
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prospective jurors’ privacy as persistently after the trial or empanel-
ment, respectively.
241
 
Last, the risk that the media will contact or attempt to contact 
prospective jurors in high-profile cases is high.  The likelihood of its 
occurrence surely must increase dramatically in situations where the 
district judge empanels an anonymous jury, the media challenges the 
jurors’ anonymity, and then the media requests the jurors’ names 
and addresses.
242
  While the media might be more inclined to investi-
gate the jurors’ backgrounds after requesting only their names, the 
prospect of the media both investigating and contacting the prospec-
tive jurors dramatically increases when the media also requests the 
prospective jurors’ home addresses.  District judges usually ask that 
prospective jurors avoid contact with the media because such contacts 
can result in the disclosure of information that the jurors should not 
hear, including the various opinions in the press.
243
  Either result can 
corrupt prospective jurors, which is problematic because it depletes 
the size of the venire and affects the justice system’s efficiency if the 
court must obtain a new venire panel.  Additionally, the risk that the 
media will contact prospective jurors can heighten jurors’ fears.  For 
instance, it can increase juror anxiety where a juror might already 
have concerns about privacy and intimidation.
244
  The increased an-
xiety can pressure a juror into taking a position without listening to 
the evidence.
245
  Some empirical studies have confirmed that in-
creased media scrutiny and exposure to views expressed in the press 
 
 241 This has certainly been the approach of some district courts.  See id.  But the 
key phrase is “less likely.”  Some cases will inevitably result in continued investiga-
tions and privacy invasions by the media of actual trial jurors following a verdict or of 
prospective jurors following empanelment. 
 242 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 920 n.20 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating 
that the media “is really complaining about . . . the enhanced difficulty of contacting 
former jurors to interview them”). 
 243 A natural response is to suggest that the judge ban any contact between the 
jury and media.  But this assumes that both the jurors and the members of the press 
corps will comply with the order.  See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 
311–13 (1959) (describing how jurors sought out news articles on the defendant’s 
prior convictions despite instructions from the trial judge to the contrary). 
 244 See generally King, supra note 234. 
 245 See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979) (“If ‘the ano-
nymous juror feels less pressure’ as the result of anonymity, this is as it should be—a 
factor contributing to his impartiality.”) (citation omitted). 
FERSKO (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  5:00 PM 
802 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:763 
 
can pressure jurors.
246
  The result is a tendency amongst non-
anonymous juries to conform their decisions to the public’s views.
247
 
When district courts are unable to address the effect of high-
profile cases on individual jurors at the early stage of jury selection, 
the criminal-justice system suffers.  For example, juror fears of inti-
midation and privacy invasions, regardless of their credibility, are a 
legitimate concern for the justice system because citizens might be 
less willing to serve as jurors.
248
  Additionally, when jurors are subject 
to media influence—in particular media contact—the jurors are of-
ten no longer capable of serving on the jury as a result.
249
 
b. Effects of Anonymity and Jurors’ Obligations to the 
Public 
The most important policy consideration weighing against juror 
anonymity and in favor of public access to prospective jurors’ names 
is that the jurors exercise a government power, which requires ac-
countability to the public, not just the parties.  Emphasizing how the 
jurors exercise a government power, scholars have called the jury the 
“lower judiciary bench.”
250
  Opponents contend that the country’s 
democratic values support a right of public access because allowing 
the exercise of such power by unknown persons in secret is not within 
 
 246 See generally Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: 
Toward a Social Contingency Model, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331 
(1992). 
 247 See id. at 341.  Some might argue it is not always bad for trial jurors to conform 
their views to the public’s views.  Although this can be true, the public is unlikely to 
be equally as informed as are the trial jurors who must sit through all of the testimo-
ny, cross-examinations, and evidence presentations.  Most members of the public do 
not necessarily form their opinion based on such a comprehensive amount of infor-
mation or swear to act according to the law and facts. 
 248 See, e.g., JURY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES COMM., ARIZ. SUPREME COURT AD HOC 
COMM., SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT CONCERNING JUROR ANONYMITY 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/SupRptJuryAnon.pdf (“Offering anonymity is a 
small gesture that may make the jury experience more comfortable for many who 
would otherwise ignore or resent being called to serve.”). 
 249 For the effect of pretrial publicity on jurors, see Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie 
Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations 
for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 
6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677 (2000); Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, 
Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the Law and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 428 
(1997). 
 250 See, e.g., JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 218 (1814) (comparing the jury, as the lower 
house relative to the judge, to the House of Representatives, as the lower house rela-
tive to the Senate). 
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the makeup of a democracy.
251
  Accountability, the argument goes, 
occurs when the public is in a position to scrutinize the jurors and 
ensure that no conflicts of interest, biases, misconduct, or corruption 
exist.  When this occurs, accountability yields greater reliability in the 
verdict itself.
252
  In other words, it ensures actual fairness, the “ap-
pearance of fairness,” and “public confidence in the system.”
253
 
Although jurors must be accountable to the public, jurors are 
not accountable to the public in the same way as judges and elected 
officials.  Either voters elect public officials or elected officials ap-
point other public officials—as is the case with federal judges—which 
instills a democratic element of control over the process for elected 
and appointed officials.  Thus, anonymity would be inconsistent with 
this democratic element of control.  On the other hand, the justice 
 
 251 See Ephraim Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The Anonymous Jury: Jury Tampering 
by Another Name?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1994, at 14, 15–16 (arguing that the American jury 
trial has been public from its beginnings); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 507–09 (1984) (“[T]he entire trial proceeded 
openly . . . . This open process gave assurance to those not attending trials that oth-
ers were able to observe the proceedings and enhanced public confidence. . . .  Pro-
ceedings held in secret would deny th[e] [public an] outlet [for concern, outrage, 
and hostility] and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public proceedings 
vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders 
are being brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly 
selected.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (“People in an open society do not demand 
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are 
prohibited from observing.”); In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(“[T]he risk of loss of confidence of the public in the judicial process is too great to 
permit a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury whose members may maintain ano-
nymity.”). 
 252 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570–72. 
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread ac-
knowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that pub-
lic trials had significant community therapeutic value.  Even without 
such experts to frame the concept in words, people sensed from expe-
rience and observation that, especially in the administration of crimi-
nal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the support de-
rived from public acceptance of both the process and its results.  
     . . .  
     . . . A result considered untoward may undermine public confi-
dence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an un-
expected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has 
failed and at worst has been corrupted.  To work effectively, it is impor-
tant that society’s criminal process “satisfy the appearance of justice,” 
and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people 
to observe it. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 253 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508. 
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system functions best when it insulates jurors from outside pres-
sures,
254
 whether these pressures come from the public or the gov-
ernment.
255
  Joseph Story insisted, 
 The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to 
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part 
of rulers, and against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness 
on the part of the people.  Indeed, it is often more impor-
tant to guard against the latter, than the former.
256
 
Story contended that the jury trial protected defendants from the 
government and the public because the jury was impartial.
257
  Occa-
sionally, anonymity is required because it “promotes impartial deci-
sion making.”
258
  Unlike public officials, jurors obtain their power at 
random, and when jurors give up their power, they “inconspicuously 
fade back into the community.”
259
  In this regard, “anonymity would 
 
 254 History supports this concept.  Jurors may hold their deliberations in secret.  
See generally Shaftesbury’s Trial, (1681) 8 Howell’s St. Tr. 759 (K.B.) (Eng.).  Jurors 
are immune from prosecution based simply on the outcome of the verdict.  See gener-
ally Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (K.B.).  Jurors may even express dissa-
tisfaction with the law under which the state indicts the defendant through jury nulli-
fication.  See generally The Trial of John Peter Zenger, (1735) 17 Howell’s St. Tr. 676 
(N.Y.) (Colonial Am.).   
 255 See TAYLOR, supra note 250, at 219 (“It is evidently of equal or superior impor-
tance to life, liberty, and property, that juries should be independent of kings, presi-
dents, factions, and demagogues . . . .  Judges were made independent of the crown 
in England, because judgements were made instruments of tyranny.  Verdicts of ju-
ries may become such instruments.  A president can select juries of his own faction, 
by his officer, the marshal, and infallibly mould political verdicts.”).  Critics might 
contend that because verdicts may become instruments of tyranny, the public needs 
to know who sits on the jury.  This is a good reason to know the trial jurors’ identi-
ties, but it generally does not support the proposition that the public should know 
the prospective jurors’ identities because prospective jurors have nothing to do with 
the verdict.  At the same time, critics may still point out that disclosure of prospective 
jurors’ identities is important because disclosure allows an observer to determine 
whether the parties fairly selected the trial jury or whether anyone collaborated with 
the prospective jurors to ensure that the trial jurors were preordained. 
 256 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
1774, at 653 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). 
 257 See id. (“The appeal for safety can, under such circumstances, scarcely be made 
by innocence in any other manner, than by the severe control of courts of justice, 
and by the firm and impartial verdict of a jury sworn to do right, and guided solely by 
legal evidence and a sense of duty.”). 
 258 United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 259 Id.  Jury selection is not entirely random because the parties choose the trial 
jurors.  Thus, one reason to know the prospective jurors is to ensure that the venire 
panel is random in the first place and not skewed by the government.  Yet this is why 
this Comment advocates that the parties continue to receive the prospective jurors’ 
identities. 
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seem entirely consistent with, rather than anathema to, the jury con-
cept.”
260
 
As previously mentioned, opponents of the anonymous jury con-
tend that juror accountability to the public addresses concerns over 
conflicts of interest, biases, misconduct, or corruption.  Yet voir dire, 
where only the judge and the parties know the prospective jurors’ 
identities, addresses these concerns and is consistently available as a 
tool for the parties to root out bias, corruption, and other disqualify-
ing information.
261
  On the other hand, relying on the media to scru-
tinize the jurors for problems is speculative at best.  Reliance on the 
media assumes that the media will conduct an investigation into the 
jurors’ backgrounds, that the media’s investigations will be thorough, 
and that the discovered information actually affects whether each ju-
ror remains on the jury.  The court and the parties cannot ensure 
that the media will conduct these inquiries consistently from trial to 
trial or that the information will affect the jury’s makeup.  Clearly, 
any post-trial investigation is a valuable source of information for 
many reasons, including gaining insight into the jury’s deliberative 
process and trying to uncover corruption or misconduct, which is 
much easier once the investigator knows how the jurors voted.  Nev-
ertheless, if the voir dire process has a flaw because the parties are 
unable to conduct a proper investigation, then the system should not 
rely on the media to fix the flaw.  Instead, the system should fix the 
flaw. 
Finally, while accountability is an important issue, only trial ju-
rors must account to the public for the verdict.
262
  After all, only trial 
jurors cast a vote during jury deliberations, which result in the ver-
dict.  Prospective jurors, however, are just that—prospective.  In this 
regard, timing is crucial to the accountability issue.  The balance be-
tween risks to the juror and accountability to the public is a matter of 
timing.  Accountability is most central after the trial because, with the 
verdict in hand, the public has a right to know whether the verdict is 
 
 260 Id. 
 261 See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (suggesting that the purpose 
of voir dire is to select an impartial jury).  After all, under the scenario for which this 
Comment advocates, the parties have access to the prospective jurors’ identities and, 
thus, are in a position to investigate. 
 262 Arguably, prospective jurors are accountable, though to a lesser extent, be-
cause they have an obligation not to engage in juror misconduct.  In this regard, 
prospective jurors have an obligation not to take themselves out of contention to be 
on the jury by, for example, accepting a payoff so that someone can shape the actual 
trial jurors by eliminating undesirable prospective jurors. 
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reliable.  Juror risk, however, is vitally important before the trial be-
cause, if the court were to release prospective jurors’ names to the 
media, the court would place all of the risks of a trial juror on a pros-
pective juror without knowing whether the prospective juror would 
have any say in the verdict. 
C. Effect of Wecht II upon Judicial Discretion 
By requiring that trial judges disclose the names of the prospec-
tive jurors, Wecht II not only imposes a heavier burden on district 
court judges who choose to keep prospective jurors anonymous up to 
empanelment in high-profile trials, it also violates the Supreme 
Court’s and Congress’s clear preference that district court judges 
control the jury-selection process.
263
 
By extending the First Amendment right of access to prospective 
jurors’ names and addresses before empanelment, Wecht II imposes a 
much heavier burden on district court judges than the case law has 
previously imposed.  Under the First Amendment, district court 
judges must overcome an “overriding interest” and closure must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”
264
  Under the common-law 
right of access, however, district court judges are not subject to this 
heightened burden.  Instead of “overriding interests,”
265
 district court 
judges must overcome “countervailing interests.”
266
  Additionally, 
while the interests at stake under the First Amendment must be “nar-
rowly tailored,”
267
 courts must merely balance the interests at stake 
under the common law, which allows closure if the “countervailing 
interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access.”
268
  Although 
the exact definition of these interests is far from clear, courts agree 
that the burden of showing “countervailing interests” under the 
common law is far easier to meet than the burden of showing “over-
riding interests” under the First Amendment.
269
 
 
 263 See supra Part IV.B.1.  
 264 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 
(1984). 
 265 Id. 
 266 Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 267 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510. 
 268 Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. 
 269 Id. (“The common law does not afford as much substantive protection to the 
interests of the press and the public as does the First Amendment.”); see also In re 
Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (“The common law does not afford 
as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and public as the First 
Amendment does.”). 
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In addition to requiring that district court judges meet a higher 
burden to keep prospective jurors anonymous prior to empanelment, 
Wecht II also applies the First Amendment’s heightened standard of 
review.  Under the First Amendment, many of the circuits require 
that district court judges jump through a number of procedural 
hoops to achieve closure.
270
  The Supreme Court also requires that 
district court judges make specific findings of fact supporting closure, 
provide reasons for denying alternatives to closure, and ensure all of 
this is on the record so that the reviewing court can determine 
whether the ruling was appropriate.
271
  All of this suggests that a dis-
trict court ruling regarding anonymous prospective jurors is reviewed 
de novo under the First Amendment.  By comparison, the Supreme 
Court has stated that closure orders made under the common-law 
right of access are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
272
  Thus, Wecht II 
takes the ability to assess the on-the-ground facts away from district 
court judges and places this discretion with reviewing courts. 
Consequently, Wecht II heightens the district court’s burden 
when it attempts to keep prospective jurors’ names and addresses 
from the media in high-profile trials while simultaneously placing 
control over prospective jurors’ names and addresses with the review-
ing courts rather than with the trial courts.  Significantly, this shift of 
discretionary powers over the jury-selection process from the trial 
courts to the appellate courts effectively violates long-standing judi-
cial and congressional policy.
273
 
The Supreme Court bestowed control over jury selection upon dis-
trict court judges decades ago.  Since Sheppard, the Supreme Court 
has upheld and promoted the district courts’ use of their discretio-
nary powers to combat invasive media coverage in high-profile trials.  
For example, in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, the Supreme Court 
 
 270 See, e.g., In re Knight Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234–35 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating 
that closure motions in a criminal proceeding require public notice and advanced 
docketing “to give the public and press an opportunity to intervene . . . , reasonable 
steps” to allow participation when the court knows “of the desire of specific members 
of the public to be present,” and an opportunity for interested parties “to object to 
the request”). 
 271 See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510–11. 
 272 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978). 
 273 Supporting the historical underpinning of judicial discretion, several state and 
federal courts have had specific rules permitting juror anonymity for some time.  See 
Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 746 & n.14 (Del. 1989) (citing United States v. 
Breese, 172 F. 765, 768 (W.D.N.C. 1909); State v. Felts, 133 F. 85, 92 (C.C.W.D. Va. 
1904); United States v. Antz, 16 F. 119, 125 (C.C.E.D. La. 1883)). 
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stated, “Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the 
first instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on 
his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample 
discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire.”
274
  Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court has held that trial-court rulings relating 
to the common-law right of access are reviewed for abuse of discre-
tion, which suggests great deference to trial court discretion on right-
of-access issues.
275
  Even before Sheppard, federal courts boldly asserted 
that trial courts have vast discretion with which to control voir dire, 
including when the court releases prospective jurors’ names to the 
parties and the public.
276
  This discretion over the conduct of voir dire 
rightly includes whether voir dire should occur with or without public 
knowledge of the prospective jurors’ identities. 
Congress has also supported expanded discretionary powers for 
district judges by allowing them to determine when prospective ju-
rors’ names should be public.
277
  With Wecht II, the Third Circuit 
creates doubt as to what discretionary power district judges now have 
to control the release of prospective jurors’ names in high-profile tri-
als, especially regarding what burden judges must overcome to re-
strict release.  By finding that the media has a presumptive First 
Amendment right of access to the prospective jurors’ names and ad-
dresses, the Third Circuit adds to the difficulty of district judges al-
ready burdened by the problems generally associated with high-
profile trials and the responsibility for ensuring a fair and impartial 
jury. 
V.CONCLUSION 
The Wecht II decision fails to recognize that “today’s high visibili-
ty trials” put pretrial publicity “at another order of magnitude” than 
the courts have experienced historically.
278
  Now more than ever, dis-
 
 274 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981). 
 275 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. 
 276 See United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) (holding that trial 
courts have the discretion to determine when to release the jury lists in noncapital-
offense trials); see also Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 407 (1894); United 
States v. Wilson, 104 F.2d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1939); Hendrikson v. United States, 249 F. 
34, 35–36 (4th Cir. 1918); Shelp v. United States, 81 F. 694, 696–97 (9th Cir. 1897). 
 277 See generally supra Part II.A.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 
1863(b)(7) (2006); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). 
 278 Valerie P. Hans, The Twenty-First Century Jury: Worst of Times or Best of Times?, 
CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring 2006, at 3, 4, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/ 
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trict courts need the discretion to determine how best to approach 
the complex aspects of pretrial media coverage.
279
  Wecht II denies dis-
trict courts one important approach—control over the timing of the 
release of prospective jurors’ identities to the public. 
In creating a new constitutional right under the First Amend-
ment to obtain the names and addresses of prospective jurors before 
empanelment, the Third Circuit ignores common-law traditions, pre-
vious determinations by the Supreme Court, and previous enact-
ments by Congress.  Additionally, the Third Circuit disregards the 
risks to prospective jurors and the judicial system, in favor of an un-
substantiated claim that the public needs the prospective jurors’ 
identities to ensure a fair process.  Not only is the notion of public 
accountability difficult to substantiate with respect to jurors that have 
yet to render a verdict for which they must be accountable, the idea 
that prospective jurors must also be accountable for a verdict that 
they may never render is illogical.  The Third Circuit favors public 
accountability at the beginning of the trial process because disclosure 
will bring fairness to the process.  But the Third Circuit never subs-
tantiates its fundamental premise that disclosure of prospective ju-
rors’ identities to the media actually and positively influences pros-
pective jurors’ impartiality. 
What matters in jury selection is whether the jurors are impartial 
and represent the diverse cross-section of American society as it exists 
within the particular community; their names and addresses are irre-
levant when the parties are informed and voir dire is available.  It is 
no accident that the U.S. Post Office released its “Jury Duty” stamp in 
2007 with twelve faceless, diverse jurors pictured.
280
  “Stamps, at their 
best, can remind a nation . . . what values its citizens hold most sa-
cred.”
281
  The justice system relies on “faceless” jurors, representing 
 
journal/clb/documents/Spring2006TheTwenty-FirstCenturyJuror-TheWorstofTimes 
orTheBestofTimes-byProfessorValerie_000.pdf?rd=1. 
 279 In the trial of Martha Stewart for securities law violations, the district court 
judge, deciding that the media coverage could bias the jury before it was selected, 
closed the voir dire proceedings to the press.  See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 96 
(2d Cir. 2004).  The court order would provide the public with a transcript the fol-
lowing day.  See id. at 95.  While the Second Circuit held that the trial judge lacked a 
compelling justification for closing the proceedings, the Second Circuit stated that it 
did “not see why simply concealing the identities of the prospective jurors would not 
have been sufficient.”  Id. at 104, 106.  Yet the Third Circuit, in Wecht II, would deny 
the trial court the discretion to consider this option. 
 280 Debra Cassens Weiss, Stamp of Approval for Jury Service, A.B.A. J., Sept. 5, 2007, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/stamp_of_approval_for_jury_service/. 
 281 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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the community’s interests, to appear in open court, fulfill their ser-
vice requirement, and, just as quickly, disappear from the public 
stage. 
